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This Article identifies conflicting strands of the public interest in copyright,
then proposes to mediate those conflicts by conceiving of copyright law as a prohibition against acts of unfair competition. Under this conception, copyright
infringement would consist of the infliction of competitive harm in a “relevant
market,” a market this Article proposes to define by asking what rights creators
are entitled to expect when they engage in the act of creation. As regards
“printed works” (that is, works created for the purpose of existing in copies),
this Article argues that creators are not entitled to expect the right to exclude
others from engaging in acts of private copying, acts which, standing alone, do
not serve as market substitutes to any significant extent. Instead, creators are
entitled to expect only the right to distribute those copies to the public—for only
acts of public distribution are behaviors that threaten to cause the sorts of competitive harms that Congress should seek to redress. This Article concludes by
revealing how such a copyright law might help to resolve a few of the issues at
the very center of the copyright debate: the pervasiveness of personal copying,
the rise of contractual and technological access controls, and, of course, the
“death” of the fair use defense.
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INTRODUCTION
In section 107 of the Copyright Act, Congress codified the defense
known as “fair use,” under which qualifying, unauthorized uses of
copyrighted works “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research [are] not . . . infringe1
ment[s] of copyright.” Scholars have described fair use, variously, as
2
a remedy for “market failure,” and therefore a temporary substitute
3
4
for functioning markets; a doctrine slouching toward irrelevance

1

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
Professor Wendy Gordon articulated this theory more than twenty years ago, and
her work has inspired dozens of responses—too many to cite here. See Wendy J.
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case
and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1616 (1982) (“[F]air use implies the consent of the copyright owner by looking to whether the owner would have consented
under ideal market conditions.”).
3
See Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of
an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 113, 125 (2003)
(“[T]he ‘market failure’ genre of fair use should fade away in a world of perfect price
discrimination . . . .”); Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:
Transaction Costs Have Always Been Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149,
155 (2003) (noting that the “excuse” type of fair use “should and does disappear if,
because of institutional or technological change, the excusing circumstances disappear”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change, the Less They Seem “Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251, 265 (1998)
(“Implicit in Professor Gordon’s [market-failure] approach to fair use, however, is an
element of temporal instability.”).
4
See Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
133, 137 (2003) (“For the great bulk of uses previously excused because of transaction
costs, the [fair use] doctrine will simply become irrelevant.”).
2
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5

and even death as markets become more sophisticated; a tool for advancing social goals when a finding of infringement promises to pro6
7
duce “bad results”; and a doctrine that is empty of substance and
8
therefore “dangerous” because it creates the illusion that there are
limits to an increasingly unlimited entitlement. In other words, copyright scholars cannot agree on what, exactly, the fair use defense is for.
What hope is there for the courts?
Nowhere is this disagreement more apparent than in the dispute
over the Google Library Project, in which Google proposes to scan
every book owned by several university libraries and the New York
9
Public Library. The resulting digital images would constitute a powerful research tool: not only would the images be searchable by keyword but researchers also could view the results of their searches
online in image form—along with bibliographic information enabling
10
them to purchase (or borrow) the books of greatest interest.
In

5

See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903,
906 (2005) (describing the “common claim, that fair use is dead”); cf. Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millennium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
193, 193-95 (2000) (discussing the death of copyright in the context of the death of
other areas of law); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 814 (2001) (arguing that “[c]opyright is dead”).
6
Since publishing her groundbreaking article, supra note 2, Professor Gordon has
defined “market failure” more broadly to take into account considerations of social
justice. She now believes that “it makes sense to use the term ‘market failure’ broadly,
whenever we have grounds to believe that bad results will follow from adhering to the
rule of owner deference.” Gordon, supra note 3, at 164; see also Dan L. Burk & Julie E.
Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 44
(2001) (“The 2 Live Crew case thus is emblematic of a second type of market failure in
which the value of socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works is not fully internalized.”).
7
See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 396, 402 (2005) (arguing that “the statute itself has
become not the embodiment of copyright’s blended nature, as Professor Weinreb argued, but a placeholder for all manner of arguments about limits” and that “[t]he substantive emptiness of fair use makes it something of a dumping ground for copyright
analysis that courts can’t manage in other areas”).
8
See Gordon, supra note 5, at 904 (discussing why fair use might be considered
“dangerous”); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1992, at 185, 205 (criticizing the notion that “[w]e do not have to worry
about the use of copyright to impede the dissemination of ideas and information . . .
because fair use is there to privilege such uses”).
9
See JONATHAN BAND, AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, OITP TECHNOLOGY POLICY BRIEF: THE GOOGLE
LIBRARY PROJECT: THE COPYRIGHT DEBATE 1 (2006), http://www.policybandwidth.com/
doc/googlepaper.pdf.
10
Id.
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short, “[t]he Library Project [would] make it easier than ever before
11
for users to locate the wealth of information buried in books.” Because some of those books would be copyrighted, Google has announced that if a search produced a “hit” on a copyrighted work, researchers could view only a few sentences from that work, in the form
12
of “snippets” surrounding the search term.
When Google announced its project, authors and publishers objected, arguing that Google would be engaging in repeated acts of infringement via the wholesale copying (scanning) of works in which it
13
did not own the copyrights. This was a valid objection, for the Copyright Act, in section 106, gives copyright owners the “exclusive
right[] . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies” and to au14
thorize others to do the same. The word “copies” is defined broadly,
in section 101, to include any “material objects . . . in which a work is
15
fixed by any method now known or later developed.” Because com16
puter memory (whether volatile or nonvolatile ) is a “material object,” digital scans of books stored in computer memory are “copies”
for the purposes of section 106. In response to these objections from
authors and publishers, Google proposed a change to its policy under
which copyright owners who did not wish their works to be scanned
could “opt out” by November 1, 2005, the date on which Google
17
planned to begin the expensive process of digitization. Unsatisfied
with this solution, a group of authors sued Google on September 20,
18
2005, and a group of publishers filed a similar lawsuit a month later,
19
on October 19. The cases (together, “the Google case”) are pending
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
20
York.

11

Id. at 9.
Id. at 1-2. If a search revealed a work in the public domain, researchers could
browse the work in its entirety. Id. at 1.
13
Id. at 3-4.
14
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
15
Id. § 101.
16
The information in volatile memory, such as “random access memory” (or
“RAM”), is lost when power to the computer is interrupted. By contrast, nonvolatile
memory, such as a hard disc drive or a flash memory device (“thumb drive”), can retain stored information even when the computer or device is not powered.
17
BAND, supra note 9, at 2.
18
Id. at 3.
19
Id.
20
See Complaint, Author’s Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20,
2005), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/google/aggoog92005cmp.pdf;
12
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Because the acts in which Google has engaged almost certainly
constitute prima facie infringement, the fate of its library project likely
depends on the application of the fair use defense. Section 107 of the
Copyright Act instructs courts to decide whether a disputed use is fair
21
by evaluating four statutory factors. The Supreme Court has placed
the most emphasis on the first (the commerciality of the use) and the
fourth (the effect of the use on the market for the original), and it is
easy to see why: commercial uses are more likely than noncommercial
ones to compete with sales of the copyrighted work. Further, any such
competition is likely to result in lower prices and reduced market
share for everyone, and these market effects, in turn, are likely to diminish the profits of those erstwhile monopolists, the creators (and
their assigns). Faced with the prospect of earning lower profits, at
least some potential creators are likely to forego the act of creation in
favor of other, more profitable pursuits, thus leading to a decline in
the number or the quality of works created. Nobody wants that.
The fair use defense would be easy to apply if commercial uses
usurped the market for the copyrighted work, while noncommercial
22
(“nonprofit educational”) ones did not. But there are two problems
with a fairness test for which commerciality is the linchpin: First, the
definition of “commercial” is becoming increasingly broad. One
might think that scholarly activities, at least, would be comfortably on
the gratis side of the line. Yet courts have found even the activities
listed in section 107—including scholarship—to be commercial when
users gain an indirect economic advantage by failing to pay the copyright owner for a license, thus depriving her of potential licensing
23
revenue. As a number of scholars have noted, this inquiry is circu-

Complaint, McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005),
available at http://www.publishers.org/press/pdf/40%20McGraw-Hill%20v.%20Google.pdf.
21
They are the following:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
22
See id. § 107(1).
23
See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994); see
also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that “the potential for destruction of this [licensing] market by widespread
circumvention of the plaintiffs’ permission free system is enough . . . ‘to negate fair
use’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569
(1985))).
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24

lar.
If depriving the copyright owner of licensing revenues were
enough to make a use “unfair,” then the fair use defense would be no
defense at all, for by definition, the fair use defense comes into play
25
only when a defendant fails to pay for a license. Recognizing this,
courts have asked whether the defendant has deprived the copyright
owner of licensing revenues only in “traditional, reasonable, or likely
26
to be developed markets.”
The problem with this seemingly narrower inquiry, however, is that copyright owners themselves can define whether markets for their works are “likely to be developed” by
developing those markets themselves. In other words, copyright owners themselves can define away the market failure for which fair use is
the remedy.
The only exception to this rule appears to be that “‘[c]opyright
27
owners may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets,’”
which reveals the second problem with using commerciality as a test of
24

See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1257, 1277 n.98 (1998) (“In both cases, the courts adopted circular arguments
that because a use could be licensed, it was no longer a fair use and must be licensed.”);
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41 (1997) (arguing that the Texaco court’s
“circular reasoning of ‘lost’ permission fees will become conclusive on the fourth . . .
[and] most important fair use factor” and that, “[t]herefore, allowing circular reasoning to determine [that] factor will often result in circularity dictating the outcome of a
fair use case”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 975, 1021 (2002) (asserting that the Second Circuit employed circular reasoning when, following the market failure approach to fair use, it held in Texaco that copying articles from scientific journals at the request of, and for use by, researchers qualified as copyright infringement); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4], at 13-197 (2006) [hereinafter NIMMER] (writing
of the fourth statutory fair use factor, “how can one prove a potential [impact on the
market for the copyrighted work] without simply degenerating into the tautology that
defendant occupied a certain niche, which itself proves a potential market to exist and
to have been usurped?”).
25
See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 929 n.17 (“[W]ere a court automatically to conclude in
every case that potential licensing revenues were impermissibly impaired simply because the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, the
fourth fair use factor would always favor the copyright holder.”).
26
Id. at 930; see also id. (“‘The market for potential derivative uses includes only
those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop.’” (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994))); id.
(observing that “the fourth factor [is] concerned with ‘“use that supplants any part of
the normal market for a copyrighted work”’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 65
(1975)))).
27
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir.
2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group,
Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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fairness: commerciality (or lack thereof) does not appear to be dispositive of fairness either way. As the Supreme Court warned in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., “the mere fact that a use is educational and
not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any
more than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of fair28
ness.”
The “purpose and character” of the use in Campbell was a
2 Live Crew parody of the Roy Orbison classic “Oh, Pretty Woman,”
but it was commercial nonetheless: the song was being offered for
sale in music stores nationwide, and 2 Live Crew (or more likely, its
29
record company) was making money. Whether the rap group also
was competing with Roy Orbison and his music publisher was another
question. Although it remanded this question to the district court,
the Supreme Court seemed to think the answer was no. “[A]s to parody pure and simple,” the Court wrote, “it is more likely that the new
work will not affect the market for the original in a way cognizable
30
under this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute for it.” Why not?
Because a parody is transformative, not competitive. It does not “‘supersede[]’” the original, but instead “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new
31
expression, meaning, or message.”
According to the Court, “the
goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally fur32
thered by the creation of transformative works” —even commercial
ones.
What does this mean for Google? Under existing law, Google
33
must show either market failure or transformation in order to prove
its entitlement to the fair use defense. This presents a considerable
challenge. Consider market failure first: knowing that the district
court is likely to ask whether Google has entered a market that is
34
“likely to be developed” by the plaintiffs, at least one of the plaintiffs
has hastened to develop such a market by announcing a searchable
library of its own. On December 12, 2005, HarperCollins issued a

28

510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
Id. at 573.
30
Id. at 591.
31
Id. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4901)).
32
Id.
33
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1613 (arguing that “[i]n the ordinary copyright
case, the court assumes that the defendant could have, and therefore should have, proceeded through the market”).
34
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29
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press release in which it stated its intention to “create a digital warehouse for all of its content” that would both “satisfy[] the demands of
the marketplace” and “allow[] the publisher to remain in control of
35
its digital files and intellectual property.” HarperCollins also has de36
scribed its goal as the “monetization” of its content. While the district court might refuse to credit evidence of markets developed post
hoc, it would be perfectly justified in holding that Google is depriving
the plaintiffs of potential licensing revenues by providing the public
with the means to search “monetiz[ed]” content for free. Google
used copyrighted works to enter a market, it did not pay to license
rights in those works, and the market it entered was “likely to be developed” by the owners of copyright because at least one owner has
37
actually developed it.
Google faces a similar challenge in defining (or redefining)
“transformative.” While a handful of lower courts have stretched the
38
definition to include mere reproductions, the Supreme Court in
Campbell seems to have intended that “transformative” apply only to
those derivative works in which a user takes expression from a copy35

Press Release, Erin Crum, Commc’ns Manager, HarperCollins Publishers,
HarperCollins Publishers To Create Digital Content Warehouse (Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.harpercollins.com/footer/release.aspx?id=399&year=2005.
36
Press Release, Erin Crum, Dir. Corp. Commc’ns, HarperCollins Publishers,
HarperCollins Publishers Selects Newsstand, Inc. To Develop Global Digital Warehouse (Apr. 10, 2006), available at http://www.harpercollins.com/footer/
release.aspx?id=445&year=2006.
37
To be sure, the market for permissions fails with respect to those works for
which rights holders are difficult (if not impossible) to identify—as with, for example,
books that have gone out of print. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 250 (2003)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “the permissions requirement can inhibit or prevent the use of old works . . . because the [copyright] holder may prove impossible to
find”).
38
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., for example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found transformation in the reproduction of digital photographic images as part
of a search engine. 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003). Even though the images themselves were unchanged, except in size, the court noted that the defendant was using
the images to “serve[] an entirely different function” than was the plaintiff—that is,
“improving access to information on the internet versus artistic expression.” Id. at 81819. The court also found it unlikely that anyone using the search engine would be able
to substitute the “thumbnail” reproductions for the original images, since “enlarging
them sacrifices their clarity.” Id. at 819; see also Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d
1106, 1118 (D. Nev. 2006) (listing reasons why “Google’s presentation of ‘Cached’
links to the copyrighted works at issue . . . does not serve the same functions” as did the
original work). But see Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 847 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (distinguishing Kelly because “Google’s use of thumbnails on its image search
[is] far more commercial than Arriba’s use” and “Google’s thumbnails lead users to
sites that directly benefit Google’s bottom line” through advertising revenues).
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righted work and adds expression of her own—creating, in the end,
39
40
“something new,” like a biography, an editorial, or a parody. At the
very least, according to the Court, a transformative work must “alter[]”
41
a copyrighted work with “new expression, meaning, or message”; it
would be difficult (although not impossible) to add new meaning or
42
message without adding new expression, too.
Judge Pierre Leval,
whose article on fair use appears to have inspired the Supreme Court,
probably had very much the same thing in mind. As he wrote a few
years before Campbell, a transformative work is one that “adds value to
the original . . . in the creation of new information, new aesthetics,
43
new insights and understandings.”
Google is not doing any of these things; it simply is proposing to
reproduce books in digital form, thus making them searchable online.
It is engaging in unauthorized and untransformative, though unques44
tionably beneficial, copying. The benefits for researchers are obvious, but the publishing industry stands to gain as well. If scanning

39

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
In taking expression from a copyrighted work, the user should take care not to
create a satire instead of a parody. For at least one Justice,
[i]t is not enough [for the purposes of fair use] that the parody use the original in a humorous fashion, however creative that humor may be. The parody
must target the original, and not just its general style, the genre of art to
which it belongs, or society as a whole (although if it targets the original, it
may target those features as well).
Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
41
Id. at 579.
42
In New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., decided under the Copyright
Act of 1909, one court did hold that the publishers of a “personal name index to the
annual New York Times Index” had engaged in a fair use, in part because their activities “appear[ed] to have the potential to save researchers a considerable amount of
time and, thus, facilitate the public interest in the dissemination of information.” 434
F. Supp. 217, 219, 221 (D.N.J. 1977). In that case, however, the defendants did not
engage in the wholesale copying of protected works; indeed, they copied only the
names of those persons appearing in the New York Times from 1851 through 1974. Id.
at 219. Those names likely would not be held protectable today. See 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any . . . discovery . . . .”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991) (“Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to
use the facts contained in another’s publication to aid in preparing a competing work,
so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement.”).
43
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(1990).
44
See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1137, 1143 (1990) (“A use may serve an important, socially useful purpose without being transformative, simply by making the copied material available.”).
40
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books and making them searchable online leads researchers to find
books that they otherwise might not have found, then a searchable library might help to expand the readership of books, thus leading to
increased sales and increased borrowing from libraries (which, in
turn, leads to increased sales). Google also is providing these benefits
at very low cost to the public, in significant part because nothing that
Google proposes to do has the least chance of preventing writers from
writing, or publishers from publishing. Google is not competing with
the publishing industry—as if, for example, it were enabling consumers to read copyrighted books online. In fact, it is not engaging in any
activity in which the publishing industry—until now—has shown the
remotest interest. Unfortunately, however, none of these observations
is particularly relevant to the current fair use inquiry.
The late Professor L. Ray Patterson once observed that “[m]ost
discussions of the fair use of copyrighted works provide answers without ever asking the right question. That question is not ‘what is fair
45
use?’ but ‘what is copyright?’” If fair use has become “a bizarre, occasionally tolerated departure from the grand conception of the copy46
right monopoly,” the fault lies not in the defense itself, but in the
“grand conception”: an increasingly proprietary copyright law that
overwhelmingly equates the public interest with the private interests
of copyright owners. Those private interests, in turn, largely are held
by the very companies that control the market for copyrightable
works. Is it any coincidence that the new economics of copyright
47
places so much emphasis on private ordering, in which the government plays no significant part?

45

L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992,
at 249, 249; see also Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 365
(2002) (“Whether to impose a complicated legal regime on individual consumer consumption of copyrighted works is a crucial question on which reasonable people might
differ violently. Resolving it requires us to decide what we have a copyright law for.”).
46
Leval, supra note 43, at 1110. In proposing that fair use assessments depend
“primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative,” id. at
1111, Judge Leval has argued that fair use should not be seen as merely an occasional
exception to the copyright monopoly, id. at 1110. Yet this is precisely what fair use has
become, in part because of courts’ emphasis on transformation itself.
47
See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights
Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 492 (1998) (“Market ordering presupposes some
ex ante distribution of entitlements. The cybereconomists take existing entitlements
as given, and do not inquire as to the welfare effects of alternative entitlement structures.” (footnote omitted)).
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Professor Julie Cohen has argued that “we need a theory of the
48
ordinary user: a theory of what conduct is private.” To date, however, such a theory has been elusive. Because the law described by any
49
such theory must “promote the Progress of Science,” I begin, in Part
I, by locating and examining a few of the strands of the public interest
in copyright—the inducement of creation, access to the products of
creation, and the promotion of open and populous markets in copyrighted expression. In Part II, I describe a copyright law that would
serve these interests by identifying and punishing methods of unfair
competition in the relevant markets. Because, in this Article, I focus
on the exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution (but not adaptation, performance, or display), I define the relevant markets to include only the markets for copies of copyrighted works. In these markets, I argue, acts of copying are not “unfair,” in themselves, because
they do not inflict significant competitive harms. Accordingly, I argue
that copyright owners should not enjoy the exclusive right of reproduction (which implicates private conduct), but should enjoy only the
exclusive right to distribute copies of their works to the public. In
Part III, I reveal how such a copyright law might help to resolve a few
of the issues at the very center of the debate: the pervasiveness of personal copying; the rise of contractual and technological access con50
trols; and, of course, the “death” of the fair use defense. I also examine how such a law might affect the Google case.
I. LOCATING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN COPYRIGHT
Among copyright scholars, a debate of sorts is raging as to
whether copyrights were or are “property,” and as to what the answer
51
might mean for copyright law. While these are interesting questions,

48

Julie E. Cohen, Copyright’s Public-Private Distinction, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963,
967 (2005).
49
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting to Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
50
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
51
See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1008 (2006) (“American legal
minds in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were using ‘literary,’ ‘artistic,’ and ‘intellectual’ virtually interchangeably to refer to a kind of ‘property’ in expressive works.”); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75
TEX. L. REV. 873, 895 (1997) (book review) (“[O]nly recently has the term ‘intellectual
property’ come into vogue.”); see also L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair
Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 60 (1987) (“The Constitution creates no property rights.”).
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they might not be very useful ones. Contrary to what Blackstone fa52
mously wrote, to describe something as “property” is not to say that
one has unlimited rights in it. Property rights are subject to limits,
which the government imposes in furtherance of the public welfare.
As a consequence, it might not matter very much whether copyrights
are “property” or are, instead, limited grants made for limited times,
effected through enactments of positive law “according to the will and
53
convenience of the society.” If the ownership of property is characterized by the right to exclude others, then copyrights do indeed create property rights. But copyright law also regulates; in granting
rights, it describes the range of acceptable behaviors among those having an interest in copyrighted works—that is, creators, publishers, users, consumers, and the public. When Professor Patterson wrote that
54
copyright has “both a proprietary and a regulatory basis,” he was
right, although not, perhaps, in the way he intended. Property and
regulation are two sides of the same coin: to the extent the law creates property rights in creators and their assigns, it regulates the behavior of the rest of us.
The most useful observation about copyrights as property might
be that characterizing copyrights as “property” risks conveying the impression that copyrights are more exclusive than they really are. The
word “property” connotes a broad right—that is, a right with few, if
any, exceptions. It also connotes a durable right. At a fundamental
level, the question whether copyrights are property revolves around
the extent to which the government can and should tinker with the
exclusive rights that copyright owners have come to enjoy. Most
would agree that the government has the power to do this. For the
most part, however, scholars have elided the question of what interests
the government should consider when it decides whether and how to
55
exercise this power. Obviously, the government should seek to “pro-

52

According to Blackstone, “[t]here is nothing which so generally strikes the
imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other.” WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *1-2.
53
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1286, 1291-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
54
Patterson, supra note 51, at 32.
55
But see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283, 289 (1996) (suggesting that “our fundamental, nonmonetizable interests in
expressive diversity and informed citizenship” should underlie copyright law).
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56

mote the Progress of Science,” but this injunction is so vague as to be
almost completely unhelpful. What, exactly, are the interests underlying copyright law?
The law itself is ambivalent on the subject. Consider the fair use
defense: the fact that a use can be prima facie infringing and nonetheless be “fair” suggests that the government does have the power to
shrink the property right. Courts exercise this power to safeguard the
public interest in cases in which upholding the exclusive rights of the
57
copyright owner would undermine the purposes of copyright law.
Does the public interest lie in providing copyright owners with exclusive rights that may be invaded only when the First Amendment requires it? Or, in codifying the fair use defense, did Congress delegate
to courts the authority to grant the public access to copyrighted works
when the public benefit outweighs the private harm to the copyright
holder? Courts have not provided consistent answers to these questions, and as a result, the constituencies of copyright are locked in a
struggle to define “fair use” and thus to determine the meaning of
copyright itself. At the heart of this struggle is the definition of the
“public interest.”
In the balance of this Part, I locate and examine a few strands of
the public interest in copyright: (1) the inducement of creation
through the grant of exclusive rights, (2) access to the products of
creation, and (3) the promotion of open and populous markets in
copyrighted expression.
A. The Inducement of Creation
In pursuing private interests, private actors sometimes engage in
behaviors that threaten the public interest. The government responds
by seeking to modify those behaviors, whether legislatively (by enacting statutes) or administratively (by rulemaking and enforcement).
Indeed, copyright law itself is a response to behavior that threatens
the public interest: because copyrightable works may be copied and
distributed without consuming the original, creators who released
their work to the public without the protection of copyright law soon
would find themselves competing with others for sales of copies of
56

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Leval, supra note 43, at 1110-11 (“The [statutory] factors . . . . direct courts to
examine the issue from every pertinent corner and to ask in each case whether, and
how powerfully, a finding of fair use would serve or disserve the objectives of the copyright.”).
57
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their own works. Unable, as a result, to recoup the costs of their labors, creators might reduce their investments in creation, thus leading
to the creation of fewer copyrightable works. To prevent this harm,
Congress has acted legislatively under its constitutional power to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their re58
spective Writings.” In granting exclusive rights to creators, the Copyright Act has aimed to promote the public interest by promoting “the
59
encouragement of learning” through the inducement of creation—a
goal that surely is consistent with the constitutional invocation to
60
“promote the Progress of Science.”
For the foregoing reasons, the grant of exclusive rights to creators
is widely thought to promote the public good. As courts are fond of
reminding litigants, James Madison wrote in 1788 that “[t]he public
good fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals” in the copy61
right context. But this statement is only partly correct. To be sure,
the enterprise of creation depends on granting creators the right to
prevent others from making at least some uses of their works, and accordingly, the public good flows from granting at least some individual
claims in works of authorship. But as Madison likely would acknowledge today, the public good does not always or only reside in the
62
grant of exclusive rights. The phrase “encouragement of learning”
itself suggests as much: if the enterprise of learning depends upon
the creation of copyrightable works, it also depends on the quality and
diversity of those works, as well as on their proliferation and distribution throughout society. It may even depend on their proliferation
and distribution in the form of tangible copies. It certainly depends
on giving the public the opportunity to respond to those works in
sundry ways. And none of these things is possible without allowing the
public at least some unauthorized access to copyrighted works.

58

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790).
60
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. By “‘Science’ . . . the Framers meant learning or
knowledge.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE:
A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125-26 (2002)).
61
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see
also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18 (quoting the same line from THE FEDERALIST NO. 43).
62
See Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 629
(2006) (discussing how at the founding of the United States, Madison understood “the
benefits of a limited term of copyright, both as a means of promoting utility (i.e., encouraging creation) and as a means of rewarding authors for their labors”).
59
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B. Access to the Products of Creation
In determining whether a defendant has engaged in copyright infringement, courts first establish whether the defendant copied a
copyrighted work; in the absence of any direct evidence of copying,
63
courts ask whether the defendant had “access” to the original. This
stands to reason, for it would be impossible to copy a work without
having seen it (or, in the case of music, having heard it). For this
purpose, courts have defined “access” as the “reasonable opportunity”
64
to view (or hear) a copyrighted work. One can imagine having perfectly legal access to that work, as if, for example, one were to buy a
copy of a copyrighted novel. But buying a copy of a novel does not
give the buyer the right to use the copyrighted work “fixed” in that
copy—that is, the creative expression itself—however she wishes. As
section 202 of the Copyright Act provides, “[o]wnership of a copyright . . . is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the
65
work is embodied.” The copy is one thing; the expression is quite
another. Thus, for most purposes, the word “access” indicates an interaction between a human being and the expression contained
within a copy of a copyrighted work.
Obviously, copyright owners want human beings to interact with
their expression, but they also want to control the terms of such interactions. About one hundred years ago, in testifying before Congress,
Arthur Steuart, Chairman of the Copyright Committee of the American Bar Association, talked of binding the reading public by a contract
placed on the first page of a book, “prohibiting [them] from doing
66
anything with [the] book except reading it themselves.”
Authors
63

See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d
Cir. 1998) (stating that “‘indirect evidence’” of copying can include showing that the
defendant had “‘access to the copyrighted work’” (quoting Laureyssens v. Idea Group,
Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992))).
64
Judith Ripka Designs, Ltd. v. Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing, inter alia, ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir.
1983) (noting that access could have been found “because of the wide dissemination
of [the song “He’s So Fine”],” the copyrighted work at issue, during the period in question)).
65
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
66
Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the S. and H. Comms. on Patents, 59th
Cong. 164 (1906) (statement of Arthur Steuart, Chairman, ABA Copyright Comm.).
Steuart was quite clear in his responses to his congressional questioners:
Mr. Walker. According to this bill as you understand it, would it be competent for an author to print under his copyright notice a reservation prohibiting people from doing anything with that book except reading it themselves?
Would it be competent for the author to prohibit the sale of that book by the
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and publishers want the same thing today: they want people to buy
and read copies of their books, but they do not want people to share
those books, or worse, to engage in any further interaction with the
expression inside. To quote Professor Yochai Benkler, authors and
publishers want people to be “consumers” of copyrighted expres67
sion—not “users” of it.
To a significant extent, copyright law gives authors and publishers
what they want. Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives a copyright
owner “the exclusive rights . . . (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work
in copies . . . ; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; [and] (3) to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted
68
work to the public.” An owner of copyright in a qualifying type of
work (including books) also receives “the exclusive rights . . . (4) . . .
to perform the copyrighted work publicly; [and] (5) . . . to display the
69
copyrighted work publicly.” Any such access to a copyrighted work
must be bought and paid for—or, in the alternative, may be had only
after the expiration of the copyright. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the
70
general public through [unauthorized] access to creative works.”
The public benefits from such access, however, only “after the
71
limited period of exclusive control has expired.”
For the dupurchaser?
Mr. Steuart. Yes, sir. . . . [U]nder the absolute right of the author, he could
make any reservation he pleased. In other words, this so-called sale would be
nothing but a license to read.
Mr. Mckinney. May I ask a question, Mr. Steuart? Was it the object of the
draftsmen of this bill to break up the second-hand book business?
Mr. Steuart. Not at all.
Id.
67

As Professor Benkler explained, “[u]sers are individuals who are sometimes
consumers, sometimes producers, and who are substantially more engaged participants, both in defining the terms of their productive activity and in defining what they
consume and how they consume it.” Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards
a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1268 (2003).
68
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (2000). In this Article, I focus on the first and third section 106 rights.
69
Id. § 106(4)-(5). The final subsection provides a copyright owner with “the exclusive right[] . . . (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.” Id. § 106(6).
70
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (emphasis added).
71
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (emphasis added); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 241 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[U]ltimate public access is the overriding purpose of the constitutional provision.”); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (holding that in “balanc[ing] . . .
the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and
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ration of the copyright term, copyright owners have the right to require payment in return for access, or even to refuse access to the
72
work altogether. Indeed, courts have a word for unauthorized access
73
to a work during its copyright term: “infringement.”
So far as courts are concerned, construing access as “access, eventually” is the easiest way in which to “enrich[] the general public
74
75
through access” while promoting “the encouragement of learning.”
On the one hand, copyright law is supposed to induce creation (and
therefore encourage learning) by giving copyright owners the right to
exclude the public from interacting with their works in statutorily
prohibited ways. On the other hand, copyright law is supposed to
grant the public the opportunity to interact with copyrightable works.
While these purposes may not “oppose each other with exactly equal
76
force,” as Professor Glynn Lunney has argued, they are at least partly
contradictory. Courts have responded to this “paradox” by placing a
finger on the scale, “implicitly presuming that more incentives are de77
sirable in the absence of some unusual need for access” during the
copyright term. In other words, in the tug of war between induce78
ment and unauthorized access, inducement almost always wins.

the public’s need for access to creative works . . . [t]he copyright term is limited so that
the public will not be permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist’s labors.”).
72
See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228-29 (“[N]othing in the copyright statutes would prevent an author from hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright.”).
73
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985)
(“Any copyright infringer may claim to benefit the public by increasing public access to
the copyrighted work.”).
74
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527.
75
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
76
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND.
L. REV. 483, 486 (1996).
77
Id. at 487.
78
There are exceptions to this rule. In Meeropol v. Nizer, the district court found
that the distribution of a book about Julius and Ethel Rosenberg “‘serve[d] the public
interest in the free dissemination of information,’” even though it contained portions
of their copyrighted letters. 361 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (1966)). Similarly, in
Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, the district court refused to halt the publication of a
book containing copies of frames of the Zapruder film, holding, in part, that “[t]here
is a public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President Kennedy.” 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). As precedents, however, these
cases are exceptionally weak. Not only did they both arise from events of unusual historic importance, but courts have questioned whether they were rightly decided, even
on their unusual facts. See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d
576, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The district court [in Bernard Geis] . . . may not have
properly evaluated the potential economic harm to the owner of the copyright in
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If providing the public with unauthorized access to copyrighted
79
works is, like fair use, a “bizarre . . . departure” from the preference
for more incentives (which is to say, more rights), then one cannot
help but feel that the courts are missing something very important
about access: access is not something that inherently must be withheld entirely from the public until the end of the copyright term. Access, very much like property itself, is not absolute; it is qualified. That
is, unauthorized access to some of a copyrighted work can be granted
to some of the public for some purposes without sacrificing the public
interest in inducing creation. The limited nature of the grant of
80
rights in section 1 of the Copyright Act of 1909 supports this notion.
More recent examples include sections 107 through 122 of the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, in which Congress has enacted pages
81
of limitations on the broad rights enumerated in section 106. For
the most part, Congress has defined those limitations very narrowly,
but it need not have done so. Instead, Congress could have provided
creators with fewer rights, thus providing the public with increased ac82
cess to the fruits of creation.
Congress also could have asked
whether there might be other strands of the public interest in copy-

granting summary judgment to the defendants.” (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR
USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 98-100 (1985))); Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F.
Supp. 483, 489 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“To the extent [Bernard Geis] rests upon the idea that
copyright must yield where ‘there is a public interest in having the fullest information
available in [sic] the murder of President Kennedy’, it is probably inconsistent with
[Harper & Row].” (quoting Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. at 146)).
One other case bears mentioning. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., the Supreme Court cited a finding by the district court that copying television programs for later viewing “served the public interest in increasing access to television
programming.” 464 U.S. 417, 425 (1984). According to the district court, that interest
was “consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access
to information through the public airwaves.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ultimately siding with the district court in its holding, id. at 456, the Supreme Court
seemed convinced by this analysis. As Professor Jessica Litman has chronicled, however, Sony was an exceptional case in every way. See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox,
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 929-30 (2005) (discussing how the Justices reacted to the
first oral argument of Sony before the Supreme Court).
79
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
80
See Ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76 (listing the particular rights enjoyed by
owners of copyright in particular types of works).
81
17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2000).
82
See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1815
(2000) (“[T]hose who favor a system more closely resembling traditional copyright law
need to explain why a regime of complete entitlements plus compulsory limitations is
not functionally equivalent to a regime of incomplete entitlements.”).
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right, such as the existence of open and populous markets in copyrighted expression.
C. Open and Populous Markets in Copyrighted Expression
To date, Congress has not focused on the public benefit to be
gained by promoting competition in copyright “markets,” but it has
described this value in general by enacting a host of other federal
83
statutes. These include the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of
84
85
1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, the Communica86
87
tions Act of 1934, the Lanham Act of 1946, the Cable Television
88
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, and the Tele89
communications Act of 1996.
To be sure, the foregoing statutes
were not enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Con90
stitution, nor do they create rights in “original works of author91
ship.” They do, however, regulate the behavior of participants in the
markets in which copies of copyrighted works are bought and sold. As
a consequence, I believe these statutes to be instructive, not only with
respect to how Congress has served the interests of creators, publishers, users, consumers, and the public in general, but also with respect
92
to how Congress has described those interests. Those descriptions
converge to a surprising degree.
In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Act, which prohibits
companies from monopolizing trade or from entering into any “contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or [inter-

83

Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730.
85
Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717.
86
Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
87
Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427.
88
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
89
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
90
Cf. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (holding that Congress did
not have the authority to promulgate trademark legislation pursuant to that clause).
91
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
92
See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1181 (2000) (“[I]ntellectual property law is part of a larger
framework that includes other public and private law, including, particularly, antitrust.”).
84
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93

state] commerce.” Congress expanded its reach in the Clayton Act
of 1914, which proscribes specific acts, such as mergers and acquisitions, that either “substantially lessen competition” or “create a mo94
nopoly in any line of commerce.” In 1914, Congress also created the
Federal Trade Commission to investigate and prosecute “unfair meth95
ods of competition in commerce” —that is, acts “which if left untouched would probably create the evils prohibited by the
96
Sherman . . . Act.” While scholars disagree as to the legislative intent
97
behind these enactments, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has suggested that, “consistent with nineteenth century American ideology
generally, . . . the antitrust laws were passed out of a pervasive fear of
98
private ‘bigness’ and the political power that it engendered.”
“[P]rivate ‘bigness’” also can lead to market power: large companies (and combinations of companies) have greater resources than
their competitors, thus giving them the ability to price their goods be99
low the cost of production—at least for a time. Competitors who do
not have the resources to lower their own prices soon find themselves
with reduced shares of the market. As the large companies gain market share by squeezing out competitors, they also gain the ability to return prices to higher levels. Consumers, who are forced to pay those
higher prices, experience a reduction in what economists term “con100
sumer’s surplus.”
Consumers also lose the opportunity to purchase

93

Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209.
Ch. 323, §§ 2, 3, 7, 38 Stat. 730, 730-32; see also Dictograph Prods. v. FTC, 217
F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1954) (“Congress, in passing the Clayton Act, sought to bring
within the scope of its proscriptive provisions, conduct and practices which though
dangerous to the competitive structure, were not covered at all or only inadequately
covered by the provisions of the Sherman Act.”).
95
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, §§ 1, 5, 38 Stat. 717, 717, 71921.
96
Butterick Publ’g Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1936) (citing FTC v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); FTC v. Sinclair Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923)).
97
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE § 2.1a, at 47-51 (2d ed. 1999) (describing the historical background
of antitrust regulation under the Sherman Act).
98
Id. § 2.1a, at 50-51.
99
This practice is known as “predatory pricing.” See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1986) (“Predatory pricing may be defined as pricing
below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in
the short run and reducing competition in the long run. It is a practice that harms
both competitors and competition.”).
100
See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 79 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d
ed. 1986) (defining “consumer’s surplus” as “a measure of the benefit to a consumer,
94
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products from those companies that never enter the market because
of predatory pricing or other barriers to entry. Congress has enacted
the antitrust laws in order to “protect the public against [these] evils
101
commonly incident to monopolies”:
higher prices, products or services of lesser quality, and fewer choices as a result of competitors exit102
ing the market.
As the Ninth Circuit put it, “[w]hen a producer is
shielded from competition, he is likely to provide lesser service at a
higher price; the victim is the consumer who gets a raw deal. This is
103
the evil the antitrust laws are meant to avert.”
In addition to addressing “bigness,” Congress also has expressed
its concerns about “concentration,” or the tendency of an industry to
consolidate through mergers, acquisitions, and other such transac104
tions.
In 1890, Senator Sherman himself indicated that, in proposing legislation, he was motivated by a “desire to put an end to great
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual
105
before them.”
And in 1950, Congress amended section 7 of the
Clayton Act because it “fear[ed] . . . what was considered to be a rising
106
tide of economic concentration in the American economy.”
Congress did not target industry concentration simply because concentration leads to higher prices, although this concern would have been

net of the sacrifice he has to make, from being able to buy a commodity at a particular
price”).
101
United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388 (1923) (explaining the
purpose of the Sherman Act).
102
See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act . . .
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress . . . .”); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
493 (1940) (noting that the Sherman Act was intended to prevent “restraint to free
competition in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or
consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special
form of public injury”); Beal Corp. Liquidating Trust v. Valleylab, Inc., 927 F. Supp.
1350, 1367 (D. Colo. 1996) (“The federal antitrust laws seek to prevent manufacturers
and sellers of products from exiting the market.”).
103
United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
104
See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir.
1979) (noting that section 2 of the Sherman Act is designed to prevent “a pernicious
market structure in which the concentration of power saps the salubrious influence of
competition”).
105
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
106
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962); see also Monfort of
Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 576 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that “Congress
intended section 7 of the Clayton Act to prevent” industry concentration, which likely
results in “substantially lessened [competition] because of tacit collusion”).
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sufficient justification for congressional action. Congress also wished
to “perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost,
an organization of industry in small units which can effectively com107
pete with each other.”
Such competition yields a host of benefits
including product diversity, which is particularly important when the
108
“product” is information.
As the Supreme Court famously wrote in
Associated Press v. United States, “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wel109
fare of the public.”
As the foregoing discussion should make clear, the antitrust laws
target public evils, not private ones. Accordingly, the antitrust laws exist not to “protect deserving private persons, but to vindicate the pub110
111
lic interest,” which the case law describes as “paramount.”
Courts
have described the nature of that interest in several ways. First and
foremost, the consuming public has an interest in the existence of
112
“fair price competition in an open market” characterized by that
113
particularly American value, “equality of opportunity.”
Second, the

107

Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 429 (emphasis added).
See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market . . . .”);
United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 586 (D.D.C. 1987) (“‘[I]n promoting
diversity in sources of information, the values underlying the First Amendment coincide with the policy of the antitrust laws.’” (quoting United States v. AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. 131, 184 (D.D.C. 1982))); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1958) (observing that Congress enacted the Sherman Act to create an environment
“conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions”).
109
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (observing that the media serve “one of the most vital of all general interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as
many different facets and colors as is possible”), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
110
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1972) (citing N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4; D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S.
165, 174 (1915)).
111
Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970, 975 (D. Or. 1939)
(citing Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930)).
112
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979).
113
See William Goldman Theatres v. Loew’s, Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 743 (3d Cir. 1945)
(“The purpose of the anti-trust laws [was] an intendment to secure equality of opportunity . . . .”); Prairie Farmer Publ’g Co. v. Ind. Farmer’s Guide Publ’g Co., 88 F.2d 979,
982 (7th Cir. 1937) (“Clearly, the purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to secure
equality of opportunity . . . .” (citing Paramount, 282 U.S. at 42)); El Aguila Food Prods.
Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 612, 627 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (characterizing “an
equal opportunity to engage in business, trade, and commerce” as “the primary feature
of the private free enterprise system” that antitrust laws seek to safeguard).
108
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public interest lies in the existence of a populous market in which
114
“small units,” including individuals, can have an impact.
These
market structures, in turn, are likely to facilitate public access to a diversity of products.
These conceptions of the public interest are not unique to the antitrust laws. In regulating the communications industries, Congress
repeatedly has stated its wish to open markets to increased competition. In some cases, these statements may seem hypocritical; as Professor Timothy Wu has observed, Congress supported the oligopolistic
broadcast industry in the industry’s fight to exclude cable companies
115
from the market.
On the whole, however, there are plenty of indications that Congress does believe in the benefits flowing from competitive markets, including lower prices, higher quality, and diversity
of expression. As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example, Congress required telecommunications carriers to provide
competing local telephone companies with “nondiscriminatory ac116
cess” to networks and equipment.
Similarly, in the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Congress sought
117
to reverse the effects of industry concentration by requiring cable
companies to dedicate some of their television channels to local and
118
nonprofit broadcast stations, which Congress viewed as “critical to
119
an informed electorate.”
In holding these “must-carry” provisions
constitutional, the Supreme Court identified several “important governmental interests” that the provisions aimed to serve, including
“‘promoting fair competition in the market for television programming’” and “‘promoting the widespread dissemination of information
120
from a multiplicity of sources.’”

114

See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 311-24
(2004) (chronicling the conflict between the broadcast and cable television industries
and Congress’s role in it).
116
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 56, 62 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 251(b)(3), (c)(3) (2000)).
117
See Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(4), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460 (“The cable industry
has become highly concentrated. The potential effects of such concentration are barriers to entry for new programmers and a reduction in the number of media voices
available to consumers.”).
118
Id. §§ 4-5, 106 Stat. 1471-81.
119
Id. § 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. 1461.
120
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1997) (quoting Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)).
115
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To date, copyright law has not embraced these goals, or at least
has not done so expressly. One reason, perhaps, is that copyrights are
121
meant to be solutions to the problem of competition; they are legal
122
monopolies under which copyright owners enjoy the right to exclude competitors from using their works in various ways. If they
choose to exercise that right, copyright owners can market fewer copies of their works to fewer consumers at higher prices. “Thus,” as the
First Circuit pointed out, “at least in a particular market and for a particular period of time, the Copyright Act tolerates behavior that may
123
harm both consumers and competitors.”
This produces what seems
to be a direct conflict between copyright law and the antitrust laws:
copyright law gives copyright owners the right to inhibit competition,
but “[i]ntellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate
124
the antitrust laws.”
Courts are left to balance the two statutory
125
schemes, producing inconsistent results.
Copyright scholars have sought to minimize this conflict by tinkering with how they define the “relevant market” for antitrust purposes.
Instead of defining a product market to include, for example, a particular book or books by a particular author, scholars might broaden
the definition to include books of a particular type. If, as Professor
Christopher Yoo has argued, “substitutes are readily available for most
126
works,” then copyrights do not create market power at all: competitors can create or purchase their own copyrighted works, or use works
in the public domain. To quote Professor Richard Epstein, “[n]o one
has to use any particular song or story for a particular project, but can
draw on a rich culture, including items that have fallen out of copy-

121

See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 170 (1999) (“Intellectual property is a deliberate, government-sponsored departure from the principles of free competition, designed to
subsidize creators and therefore to induce more creation.”).
122
See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34
(2003) (discussing the “copyright monopoly”).
123
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1184-85 (1st
Cir. 1994).
124
In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see
also Data Gen., 36 F.3d at 1185 (“Although creation and protection of original works of
authorship may be a national pastime, the Sherman Act does not explicitly exempt
such activity from antitrust scrutiny . . . .”).
125
See 4 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 13.09[A][2][a], at 13-295 to -296 (discussing the
range of conflicting approaches that courts have taken to balancing antitrust and copyright principles).
126
Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212,
218 (2004).
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127

right protection.”
As for consumers, if they lack the resources to
buy a novel about Harry Potter, they can buy a novel about Oliver
Twist instead.
As the foregoing example suggests, there may be problems with
this approach. While some works may readily be substituted for others, some (like Harry Potter novels) almost certainly may not. Other
examples abound. Moreover, even if Professor Yoo is correct, it does
not follow, as Professor Epstein has concluded, that potential uses lost
to the copyright monopoly are “of little consequence for any dynamic
128
development of the arts.”
The reason lies in the structure of those
industries in which market participants are most likely to hold copyrights. As Professor Benkler has explained, “strong” copyrights are
especially beneficial “to organizations that own large inventories of ex129
isting information and cultural goods.”
In addition to marketing
existing works, such organizations can adapt existing works into new
ones, thus integrating the creation function with the inventory man130
agement and marketing functions.
Using the returns from this vertical integration, they also can acquire other organizations, increasing
the number of copyrighted works in their inventories. Competitors
who lack inventories of their own thus find themselves increasingly
131
marginalized. Not only does this arms race lead to industry concentration through acquisitions, but it also perpetuates itself by creating
“incentives systematically to misapply human capital to information
132
resources” in the foregoing ways.
In addition, it subjects consumers
to rising prices, diminishing supply, and a wearying homogeneity of

127

Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright
Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 23 (2005).
128
Id.
129
Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 173, 181.
130
See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 83 (2002) (“[I]ncreased protection benefits commercial information producers that vertically integrate new production with management of large-scale owned inventories of existing information . . . .”).
131
See Wu, supra note 115, at 329 (discussing how vertical integration threatens
innovation); see also Cohen, supra note 82, at 1811 (“An imbalance may result if a particular content provider has a dominant market share, or a unique and nonsubstitutable work.”).
132
Benkler, supra note 130, at 83; see also id. at 93 (positing that “inventory owners
will systematically misallocate human creativity to reworking owned-inventory rather
than to utilizing the best information inputs available to produce the best new information product”).
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133

expression.
If Disney is not “repackaging Mickey Mouse car134
toons,” it is buying Winnie the Pooh and making deals with Pixar,
135
and in the end, everything looks the same.
Thus, if copyright law is
not opposed to open and populous markets per se, it is not particularly productive of them, either.
Lawmakers appear to have assumed that the public must tolerate
these evils in order to induce creation, which is thought to be more
important than promoting competition. In fact, however, the conflict
between these values is overstated. Like copyright law, antitrust and
communications laws recognize that some return on investment, including the grant of property rights, is necessary to induce investments of capital and labor in the first place. Yet the existence of those
rights does not prevent the government from regulating the behavior
of those who enjoy them. Congress has not hesitated to place limits
on property rights in order to protect the public interest—requiring
telephone companies, for example, to provide their competitors with
access to lines and switches so that consumers could enjoy the benefits
of price competition in the market for local and long distance ser-

133

See id. at 93 (“The differential effects of increases in intellectual property protection on divergent strategies suggest that such increases lead to commercialization,
concentration, and homogenization of information production.” (footnote omitted));
see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 142 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt
Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (“[T]he greater cultural standardization likely to occur under
conditions of pervasive commodification is cause for substantial concern.” (citing
Benkler, supra note 130, at 81-99)).
As Professor Lunney has put it, “[s]eeking the common denominator among a
wider audience leads almost inevitably to a lower common denominator. As a result,
striving for popularity may produce not a wonderful, cacophonous variety, but a dulling, repetitive sameness as works include over and over the same elements intended to
cater to popular tastes.” Lunney, supra note 5, at 888-89; see also Netanel, supra note 55,
at 360 (“[G]iven market dictates and institutional risk-averseness, media conglomerates share, at least to some extent, corporate patrons’ proclivities toward prosaic and
safe products.”). This cloud may have a silver lining. As Professor William Fisher has
speculated, “[t]he less attractive the menu of material ‘on the air,’ the more time people would probably spend in more active leisure activities.” William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1778 (1988).
134
Benkler, supra note 130, at 83.
135
Worse, perhaps, “increased prevalence of Mickeys should lead to increased investment in forming preferences for their products. This should increase relative demand for their products. Repackaging the Mouse becomes not only cost effective, but
also responsive to demand.” Id. at 97-98; see also Netanel, supra note 55, at 352 (“The
public communication of fixed original expression will support a democratic civil society only if such expression is autonomous and diverse.”).
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136

vice.
Yes, the regulated companies enjoy property rights in their infrastructure, but as the Supreme Court wrote in a case brought under
the Sherman Act, “rights . . . may be pushed to evil consequences, and
137
therefore restrained” by law.
Copyright law operates under the same principles, for rights in
copyrightable works are also perfectly capable of being “pushed to evil
consequences.” Imagine, for example, how it would affect competition in the publishing industry if J.K. Rowling could prevent other
novelists from writing about boy wizards who engage in epic struggles
with dark lords. The Copyright Act prevents this competitive harm by
providing, in section 102(b), that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov138
ery.”
In extending protection to creative expressions of ideas but
not to the ideas themselves, “Congress balanced the competing concerns of providing incentive to authors to create and of fostering
139
competition in such creativity.” There are other ways in which copyright law has fostered competition: the mechanical license is an an140
cient example;
the defense of “copyright misuse” is a recent

136

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 56,
62 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3), (c)(3) (2000)).
137
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 458 (1940) (internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit similarly explained:
[Microsoft] claims an absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual
property as it wishes: “[I]f intellectual property rights have been lawfully acquired,” it says, then “their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust liability.” Appelant’s Opening Br. at 105. That is no more correct than the
proposition that use of one’s personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot
give rise to tort liability. As the Federal Circuit succinctly stated: “Intellectual
property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.”
253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Indep.
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
138
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
139
Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th
Cir. 1990).
140
As a part of the Copyright Act of 1909, Congress narrowed the performance
right in musical works by requiring songwriters to accept a compulsory royalty of two
cents per mechanical reproduction (known as the “mechanical license”). Ch. 320,
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76; see also U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Royalty Rates:
Section 115, the Mechanical License, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (listing the updated royalty rates from 1909 through 2007).
Congress believed this provision to be necessary to prevent the Aeolian Music Company from gaining a monopoly in the market for player piano rolls. See H.R. REP. NO.
60-2222, at 7-8 (1909).
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141

one.
But these examples are not evidence that Congress views the
142
Copyright Act as an adjunct to the antitrust laws.
In fact, the evidence points the other way. The oligopolistic structure of the copyright industries and their resistance to technological change are indications that Congress has given too much weight to inducement at the
expense of providing access to both competitors and the public.
In striking the balance at the heart of copyright law, Congress
must begin by locating the several strands of the public interest. First,
the public interest is served by granting creators the right to prevent
others from making at least some uses of their works, so as to provide
those creators with the level of exclusivity necessary to induce creation. Second, the public interest is served by granting the public the
opportunity to interact with copyrightable works for at least some purposes, even if copyright owners object to the terms of that interaction.
And third, the public interest is served through “‘the widespread dis143
semination of information from a multiplicity of sources,’” which
requires the government to promote at least some forms of competition in the markets for expression. These strands need not contradict
each other; they can, and should, be woven into a coherent fabric that
144
“promote[s] the Progress of Science.”
What is needed is a guide by
which lawmakers and courts can mediate the seemingly conflicting
demands of exclusive rights and unauthorized access, of legal mo145
nopolies and open markets, of inventory management and “expres-

141

The defense of copyright misuse is analagous to the patent misuse defense. See
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) (recognizing the defense of patent misuse). In the copyright context, the misuse defense “forbids the use
of the [copyright] to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the
[Copyright] Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.” Lasercomb Am.,
Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990) (alterations in original); see id. at
976 (“We are of the view . . . that since copyright and patent law serve parallel public
interests, a ‘misuse’ defense should apply to infringement actions brought to vindicate
either right.”); Lemley, supra note 121, at 151-58 (discussing the doctrine and noting
that it “is of relatively recent vintage”); infra note 281 and accompanying text.
142
Cf. Joseph Scott Miller, Patent Ships Sail an Antitrust Sea, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=923931 (suggesting
that, though antitrust and intellectual property laws may share the goal of wealth
maximization, “these two regimes pursue their shared goal through quite different
means, one by fostering competition (antitrust) and one by curtailing it (intellectual
property”)).
143
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (quoting Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)).
144
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
145
See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34
(2003) (discussing the “copyright monopoly”).
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146

sive diversity,” and of private reward and public benefit. Fortunately, that guide already exists; it is the law of unfair competition,
147
and its spirit already resides at the heart of copyright law.
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF UNFAIR COMPETITION IN COPYRIGHT
Professor Patterson once observed that “[t]he law of copyright can
be viewed most usefully as statutory unfair competition” because the
law “function[s] . . . to protect the copyrighted work against predatory
148
competitive practices.”
Copyright law does function in this way (although it has other functions, too). As we have seen, copyright law
exists at least for the purpose of punishing acts that might diminish incentives to create—as if, for example, a creator were forced to stand
by as others sold infringing copies of her works. By proscribing such
anticompetitive acts, copyright law serves one strand of the public interest: the inducement of creation. Unfortunately, copyright law also
proscribes a host of other acts that tend to promote competition. The
result is a statute that serves one aspect of the public interest while
frustrating others. It does so not only by restricting access to copyrighted expression, but also by contributing to the concentration of
markets in that expression.
This Part proceeds as follows. After describing the law of unfair
competition, I compare it to the law of copyright, noting a few similarities and differences between the two bodies of law. The comparison is a complicated one, in part because copyright law does not speak
of “competition” per se, and the law does not do a good job of defining “markets” in copyrighted works. I begin by examining how lawmakers might decide which harms constitute competitive harms in
which relevant markets. By using those definitions, and by identifying
the competitive harms in the markets for copies of copyrighted works, I
conclude that acts of reproduction, standing alone, do not constitute

146

This phrase is associated with Professor Neil Netanel, who has written extensively on the subject. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 55, at 289 (arguing that neoclassical
economists have “import[ed into copyright] a theory of property that fails adequately
to account for our fundamental, nonmonetizable interests in expressive diversity and
informed citizenship”).
147
It also resides at the heart of patent law. See United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof
Co., 61 F. Supp. 805, 812 (E.D. Mich. 1945) (“The general objectives of the Patent
Laws and the Anti-Trust Laws are the same. Both are intended to prevent unfair competition.”).
148
Patterson, supra note 51, at 6.
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149

the sorts of “predatory competitive practices” that copyright law
should seek to remedy. Accordingly, I argue that copyright owners
should not enjoy the reproduction right, but instead should enjoy only
the exclusive right of public distribution. I conclude by examining
the contours of that right.
A. Of Copyright and Public Acts
The law of unfair competition has its roots in the belief that, on
the whole, competition is good; that is, “[t]he freedom to . . . compete
for the patronage of prospective customers is a fundamental premise
150
of the free enterprise system.”
Sometimes, of course, this competi151
tion causes harm in the form of “divert[ed] business,” but the law
concerns itself with that harm only when competitors use “particular
152
methods of competition determined to be unfair.”
Among those
methods is the tort of “passing off,” which occurs when “a producer
153
misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s.”
The
usual way in which a producer commits this wrong is by marking his
goods with a trademark that confuses consumers as to the origin of
154
the marked goods.
By punishing this wrong, the law of unfair competition (and in particular, trademark law) protects producers and
consumers alike: while the law exists to safeguard the investments of
155
trademark owners by giving them exclusive rights, it also exists to

149

Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 27 n.1 (2003);
see also William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1924) (holding
that because “petitioner sought to avail itself of the favorable repute which had been
established for respondent’s preparation in order to sell its own. . . . The charge of unfair competition [was] established”).
154
See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (“[T]he
common law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.”).
Thus, “[t]he primary and proper function of a trade-mark is to identify the origin or
ownership of the article to which it is affixed.” Id. at 412. When a producer has established rights in such a mark, “others are debarred from applying the same mark to
goods of the same description, because to do so would in effect represent their goods
to be of his production and would tend to deprive him of the profit he might make
through the sale of the goods.” Id.
155
See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=889162 (arguing that “trademark law traditionally was not intended primarily
150
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156

serve the public interest in avoiding confusion. The latter principle,
in turn, confines the scope of the trademark right. Congress has codi157
fied these principles in the Lanham Act of 1946.
Like the property right in copyrights, the property right in trade158
marks is limited.
Under the Lanham Act, rights in trademarks flow
from the use of those marks in interstate commerce to identify the
source of the marked goods. This trademark use is the prerequisite to
protection because consumers cannot form the mental association between a trademark and the goods it identifies—known as “secondary
meaning”—unless those goods are released into the stream of com159
merce.
In the absence of such an association, another producer
would be free to use the trademark to identify her own products because that use would not engender any confusion. Thus, by conditioning the property right on the use of trademarks in commerce,
trademark law encourages producers to distribute goods bearing
160
those marks to the public.

to protect consumers” but “sought to protect producers from illegitimate diversions of
their trade by competitors”).
156
See Coach House Rest., Inc. v. Coach & Six Rests., Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1564
(11th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he public interest in preventing confusion around the marketplace is paramount . . . .”); James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540
F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976) (observing, in a trademark infringement action, that “[a]
third party, the consuming public, is present and its interests are paramount”).
157
Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n
(2000)); see also S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1274-75 (stating that the Lanham Act concerns itself with “securing to the owner the
good will of his business and protecting the public against spurious and falsely marked
goods”). The Lanham Act thus complements the Federal Trade Commission Act of
1914, which empowers the Commission to bring enforcement actions against those
“persons, partnerships, and corporations” engaging in “unfair methods of competition
in commerce,” ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719.
158
See Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 413 (“Common-law trade-marks, and
the right to their exclusive use, are of course to be classed among property rights;
but . . . the right grows out of use, not mere adoption.” (citation omitted)).
159
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining “trademark” and “use in commerce”).
But see 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 16:13 (4th ed. 2006) (describing cases in which courts “somewhat tentatively and
cautiously” have held that “some form of pre-sales publicity or sales solicitation may
suffice to prove priority over a rival user”).
160
Copyright law used to impose a similar requirement known as publication,
which occurs when a copyright owner makes her work “available to members of the
public regardless of who they are or what they will do with it.” Acad. of Motion Picture
Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991); see
also Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.3 (11th
Cir. 1999) (“[T]he word ‘publication’ is ‘a legal word of art, denoting a process much
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Once a producer has established rights in a mark, she has the
right to prevent others from marking their goods with symbols that
are likely to confuse consumers as to the source of those goods.
Courts determine whether such a likelihood of confusion exists by
weighing several factors, including “the strength of [the] mark, the
degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the
products” in the marketplace, “the sophistication of the buyers,” and,
161
of course, the existence of any “actual confusion.”
Thus, for the
purposes of infringement law, two producers can adopt and use the
same trademark, so long as they use the mark on different goods, in
different markets, or in different places. And while courts ask
whether the defendant acted in “good faith in adopting its own
162
mark,” bad faith, standing alone, is not enough to support the imposition of liability. Instead, courts inquire into the existence of competitive harm: in making purchasing decisions, are consumers likely
to be misled as to which product comes from which source, so as to
deprive the trademark owner “of the profit he might make through
163
the sale of the goods which the purchaser intended to buy”?
Copyright law and the law of unfair competition (including
trademark law) have a number of things in common. First, both bodies of law modify market outcomes by providing producers with limited property rights as against competitors, or those who would behave
164
in ways that the law wishes to discourage.
In trademark law, those
competitors are likely to be producers themselves, while in copyright
law, the word “competitor” includes users and consumers along with
producers, each of whom enjoys the technological means by which to
engage in anticompetitive acts. Second, both bodies of law create
property rights as inducements to investment in the production or use
of intangibles that benefit the public. As we have seen, copyrights
165
benefit the public by “promot[ing] the Progress of Science” in several important ways. And while Congress does not wish to encourage
more esoteric than is suggested by the lay definition of the term.’” (quoting Melville B.
Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 185, 185 (1956))).
161
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
162
Id.
163
Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 412.
164
One might argue that unlike copyright law, the law of unfair competition exists
to facilitate market outcomes, but this argument begs the question: what outcomes
would the market produce, absent the intervention of law? Both copyright law and the
law of unfair competition modify the functioning of voluntary exchanges between buyers and sellers.
165
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the proliferation of trademarks per se, trademarks benefit the public
by enabling consumers to distinguish between goods sold by rival producers.
While these similarities are significant, copyright law and the law
of unfair competition also differ in several ways. Among the most significant of these is the degree to which the creation and invasion of
the property right depends on whether parties engage in what one
166
might describe as “public acts.”
While there may be exceptions to
this rule, copyright law tends to ascribe legal significance to private
acts, while the law of unfair competition does not.
Consider the creation of rights. Under copyright law, if a producer wishes to obtain rights, she must either create an “original
167
work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”
or negotiate a transfer of copyright from somebody who has created
168
one.
Both of these acts can be conducted entirely in private, and
indeed they often are. Most of the time, the public has no idea that
somebody, somewhere, has created or purchased or licensed a copyrightable work. These covert (for want of a better word) events have a
public impact only when a copyright owner decides to publish her
work, by which time the property right already exists. By contrast, under trademark law, a producer wishing to obtain rights in a mark must
engage in the “bona fide use of [that] mark in the ordinary course of
169
trade.”
Trade ordinarily is “overt,” whether on the wholesale or retail level. When producers have tried to obtain rights in marks before
engaging in “commercial transactions,” courts have rejected those ef170
forts as “bad faith attempt[s] to reserve a mark.”
The two bodies of

166

The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines “public” as, inter alia, “exposed to general view,” “of or relating to business or community interests as opposed
to private affairs,” and “accessible to or shared by all members of the community.”
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/public (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). I do not use “public” to indicate “public law.” See id. (defining
“public” as “of, relating to, or affecting all the people or the whole area of a nation or
state,” and “of or relating to a government”).
167
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
168
See id. § 201(d)(1) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole
or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law . . . .”). A producer also
may obtain rights in a copyrightable work by being the “employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared” under the “works made for hire” doctrine. Id.
§ 201(b).
169
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). In some circumstances, an intent to use can give rise
to trademark rights. Id.
170
See, e.g., Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975)
(holding that a single shipment of pants with a “secondary label attached to an older
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law also diverge when it comes to the invasion of rights. A person can
infringe a copyright by engaging in an entirely private act, for section
106 provides copyright owners with “the exclusive right[] . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies,” regardless of where that re171
production takes place.
To be guilty of infringement under section
32(1) of the Lanham Act, however, a person must use a confusingly
similar mark “in commerce . . . in connection with the sale, offering
172
for sale, distribution, or advertising of . . . goods.”
Copyright law used to accord more significance to public acts than
173
it does today.
Until January 1, 1978, the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976, creators obtained rights under the federal statute
only when they engaged in the act of general publication, which happened when at least one member of the general public obtained at
least one copy of the work without being restricted from further dis174
tributing it. In most cases, this meant that rights were created upon
175
“publication in print.”
In 1976, however, Congress revised the statute to provide for the creation of rights at the moment a work was
176
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression” —regardless of
whether the work was published. As I have noted elsewhere, “[t]his
177
‘fundamental’ change led to an explosion in the number of [copyrightable works], fixed works being far more numerous, by definition,
178
than published works.”
But it also meant that, for the first time, exclusive rights could be created in private, giving the public no way of
knowing whether, and when, those rights were being created.

line of goods” was not sufficient to establish the use in commerce required for trademark protection).
171
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
172
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000); see also id. § 1125(a) (describing infringing acts
with respect to unregistered marks).
173
See Cohen, supra note 48, at 963-64 (“Copyright’s public-private distinction used
to be clearly stated on the surface of the law and transparently visible in the law’s operation. . . . [but i]ncreasingly, for users, it seems that the law no longer recognizes
conduct in private.”).
174
See supra note 160 (describing the publication requirement).
175
Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 185 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644).
176
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544-45
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000)).
177
Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 859 (1987) (“[T]he new statute makes a number of fundamental changes in
the American copyright system, including some so profound that they may mark a shift
in direction for the very philosophy of copyright itself.” (quoting Barbara Ringer, First
Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 477, 479 (1977))).
178
Stadler, supra note 62, at 641.
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Changes to the law have also enabled courts to punish private violations of those rights. Before July 8, 1870, when Congress added the
179
word “copying” to the list of exclusive rights in the statute, copyright
owners enjoyed only the exclusive rights of “printing, reprinting, pub180
lishing, and vending” their works.
Because those rights related to
publication in print, the exercise of those rights tended to involve public acts. Today, by contrast, section 106 of the Copyright Act provides
copyright owners with the exclusive right of reproduction, which—
unlike the exclusive rights of “printing, reprinting, publishing and
vending”—is violated whenever the work is “fixed” in a “material ob181
ject[]” (such as the memory devices of a home computer).
The invasion of rights under copyright law, like the creation of those rights,
is now, in many cases, a private act.
In extending the reach of copyright into the world of private acts,
lawmakers have broadened the property right, thus promoting the inducement of creation at the expense of other strands of the public interest. Conceiving of copyright as a form of “statutory unfair competi182
tion” would solve this problem, at least in part, because it would
focus the inquiry on the marketplace, which is a uniquely public (i.e.,
overt) institution. Before we can begin this inquiry, however, we must
learn to speak the language of competition.
B. The Language of Competition
If lawmakers wished to punish only those invasions of the property
right that threaten to cause competitive harm in the relevant markets
in copyrighted works, they would have to begin by defining a few
terms, including, of course, “competitive harm” and “relevant market.” Consider, first, the concept of competitive harm. Competitive
harm is not any harm. Under the antitrust laws, courts require in-

179

Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436; Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2,
2 Stat. 171, 171; Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124. Professor Patterson
believed that Congress inserted the word “copying” intending it to apply only to works
of the fine arts, Patterson, supra note 45, at 259, to which Congress extended copyright
in 1870, Act of July 8, 1870, § 86, 16 Stat. at 212. If this were true, it would mean that
most copyright owners enjoy the exclusive right of reproduction only by accident. Cf.
Patterson, supra note 51, at 12 (describing how the 1909 Copyright Act “unwittingly
enlarged the copyright owner’s rights”).
181
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies”); id. § 106(1) (providing copyright owners with the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies”).
182
See Patterson, supra note 51, at 6.
180
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jured parties to demonstrate that their injuries were caused by an
anticompetitive practice “of the type the antitrust laws were intended
183
184
to prevent,” such as predatory pricing.
Because “[t]he antitrust
laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of competition not competitors,’
[i]t is inimical to the purposes of [those] laws to award damages for
185
the type of injury” that flows merely from vigorous competition.
The law of unfair competition imposes a similar requirement. According to the Restatement, “[t]he freedom to compete necessarily contemplates the probability of harm to . . . other participants in the mar186
ket,” as when, for example, a producer lowers prices, raises quality,
or otherwise satisfies consumer desires better than its rivals do. The
law exists to remedy only those “harm[s] resulting from particular
methods of competition determined to be unfair,” including trademark infringement and other practices likely to have a negative im187
pact on the public.
Copyright law, too, recognizes that some harms are not cognizable.
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
for example, the fact that a parody may suppress demand for the
188
original does not make the use “unfair.”
According to the Court,
“the only harm” with which courts need concern themselves “is the
189
harm of market substitution.”
Echoing this language, a number of
courts have suggested that substitutive works cause competitive harms,
190
while complementary works do not.
As Judge Richard Posner ob183

Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (quoting
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
184
See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118 (1986) (“In contrast
to price cutting aimed simply at increasing market share, predatory pricing has as its
aim the elimination of competition.”).
185
Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 320 (1962)).
186
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995).
187
Id. § 1 & cmt. a.
188
510 U.S. 569, 591-92, 594 (1994).
189
Id. at 593; see also On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that fair use would be found, notwithstanding market harm, “[i]f the harm resulted from a transformative . . . use that lowered the public’s estimation of the original (such as a devastating review of a book that quotes liberally from the original to
show how silly and poorly written it is)”); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal
Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1983) (“A court would not find it relevant . . . that
[a] devastating critique had diminished sales by convincing the public that the original
work was of poor quality.”).
190
See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985) (“The Nation’s use had not merely the incidental effect but the intended purpose
of supplanting the copyright holder’s commercially valuable right of first publica-
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served in Ty, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd., “copying that is
complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are
complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a substitute
for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for
191
pegs or screws) . . . is not fair use.”
“If the price of nails fell,” Judge
Posner wrote, “the demand for hammers would rise . . . . The hammer
192
manufacturer wants there to be an abundant supply of cheap nails.”
The problem with this argument is that unlike hammers and nails,
copyrighted works can change in form and substance, giving them the
ability to exist in several markets at the same time. As Judge Posner
recognized, copyright owners want courts not only to enjoin those
copies that substitute for their works, but also those copies that “sub193
stitute . . . for derivative works from the copyrighted work.” In other
words, copyright owners want exclusivity not only in the existing markets for their works, but also in derivative markets they may (or may
194
not) develop in the future. In Ty, the owner of copyrights in Beanie
Babies wanted to control not only the market in Beanie Babies themselves, but also the markets in photographs of and books about Beanie
Babies. Judge Posner elided the issue of derivative markets by holding
that at least some of the books about Beanie Babies were not “deriva195
196
tive works” —thus answering a slightly different question.
In fact,
tion.”); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001)
(Marcus, C.J., specially concurring) (“[T]he preliminary record . . . suggests that The
Wind Done Gone will not act as a substitute for Mitchell’s original. . . . [F]urther factfinding may well reveal that these two books will act as complements rather than substitutes.”); On Davis, 246 F.3d at 175-76 (“If . . . the secondary use, by copying the first,
offers itself as a market substitute and in that fashion harms the market value of the
original, this factor argues strongly against a finding of fair use.”); Consumers Union, 724
F.2d at 1051 (“The fourth fair use factor will come into play if too much is copied or if
the entire plot is revealed, thereby usurping the demand for the original work.”).
191
292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002).
192
Id.
193
Id. (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05[B][1], at 13-193 (2002)).
194
Judge Posner explained:
A photograph of a Beanie Baby is not a substitute for a Beanie Baby. No one
who wants a Beanie Baby, whether a young child who wants to play with it or
an adult (or older child) who wants to collect Beanie Babies, would be
tempted to substitute a photograph. But remember that photographs of
Beanie Babies are conceded to be derivative works, for which there may be a
separate demand that Ty may one day seek to exploit . . . .
Id. at 518-19.
195
Id. at 520-21.
196
Id. at 520. He also declined to address the question of whether Ty was engaging in copyright misuse by using its copyrights to squelch criticism of the company. Id.
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however, there was no way for Judge Posner to know whether the copies at issue were complements or substitutes (and thus whether there
was competitive harm) without deciding, first, whether the markets in
which Ty claimed exclusivity were relevant markets to which it should
have been entitled.
This is a question for Congress, not the courts, but Congress has
not yet answered it. Worse, in failing to define the “relevant markets”
in copyrighted works, lawmakers are giving copyright owners the
power to define the scope of their own property rights by enabling
them to occupy those markets in which they wish to exercise exclusivity. Consider what would happen if courts gave monopolists the
power to define the relevant market in antitrust law: if the market
were defined broadly enough, even Microsoft would have an insignificant share of it. Similarly, in copyright law, if the market for a copyrighted work were defined broadly enough, every unauthorized use of
that work would give rise to infringement liability because every such
use would be “competing”—whether in original or derivative markets.
The result would be a copyright law that provided creators with plenty
of inducement to create (in the form of exclusive rights), but that neglected other strands of the public interest, such as the existence of
open and populous markets in copyrighted expression. In other
words, the result would be the copyright law we have today.
How might lawmakers define (and confine) the relevant markets
in copyrighted works? The answer is not to ask, as lawmakers have
done, whether giving creators this or that exclusive right in this or that
market would provide them with an enhanced inducement to create.
As I have argued elsewhere, changes in the law have conditioned creators to expect an increasing reward for engaging in the act of crea197
tion—and creators have formed incentives accordingly.
Lawmakers
hasten to safeguard those incentives by granting more rights, those
rights create higher expectations among creators, and the result is a
198
cycle in which the property right grows increasingly broad.
The

197

Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 439

(2007).
198

Id.; see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 4), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=918871 (explaining how the “practice of unneeded
licensing feeds back into doctrine,” creating “a steady, incremental, unintended expansion of copyright, caused by nothing more than ambiguous doctrine and prudent
behavior on the part of copyright users”).
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only way to escape the cycle is for lawmakers to ask not what creators
have come to expect in the way of rights, but what creators are enti199
tled to expect given the nature of the public interest in copyright.
C. The “Predatory Competitive Practice” of Public Distribution
Because the public interacts with different types of works in different ways, the rights that creators are entitled to expect from copy200
right law are likely to vary with the type of work at issue.
When it
201
comes to printed works such as books, however, the answer is reasonably clear: most authors write books so that others might pay to
read them. To accomplish this goal, authors (or their publishers)
make copies of those books and release those copies to the public in
202
return for money.
The publication of books implicates the exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution, but of the two rights, the
203
public distribution right is the one on which profit depends. It is no
accident that Congress once conditioned the grant of statutory protection on the fact of publication; not only does publication benefit

199

Stadler, supra note 197, at 476-77.
Consider the case of works that exist in a single copy, such as original paintings
and sculpture: for many “collectors of fine art, there [is] no substitute for the original,” making the relevant market in those works so narrow that the benefits of copyright might not be worth the costs of granting protection. Stadler, supra note 62, at
651.
201
See id. at 634 (defining “printed works” as “works that could be replicated without diminishing their market value among intended users making intended uses”).
Professor Landes and Judge Posner use the term “easily copied works.” William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
325, 335 (1989).
202
Authors might write books for other reasons, of course. Some of those reasons
might have nothing to do with money—as if, for example, authors were motivated to
write books in the hopes of becoming famous. Other motivations might be more mercenary: authors might write books so they can demand a royalty whenever their books
are sold by used bookstores or loaned by libraries, or even shared among friends. As
strange as it may seem, some authors might be motivated to write books so they can
demand a royalty in the event an Internet services company (like Google) decides to
scan their books and make the resulting digital images searchable on the Internet. But
just how relevant is each of these motivations? Given that some types of harms are not
“competitive harms” in “relevant markets,” harms to these markets might not be cognizable, which is another way of saying that satisfying the foregoing expectations of reward might not serve the public interest. Thus, even if some authors would not create
without being granted the right to exclude these uses, copyright law does not (and
should not) respond by providing an inducement here.
203
Patterson, supra note 51, at 7 (“[I]f copyright encourages creation, it does so
only for the purpose of profit. Profit, however, cannot be obtained without distribution.”).
200
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authors, but “intellectual conceptions benefit the public only when
204
they are released.” In providing authors (and their publishers) with
the exclusive right of public distribution, copyright law secures this
public benefit by enabling authors and their publishers to prohibit
others from competing “unfairly”—by marketing the products of creation in which they did not invest. In other words, by granting creators
the distribution right, copyright law holds that unauthorized public
205
distributions are acts of unfair, even “predatory” competition.
What of unauthorized reproductions? Professor Patterson once
206
described the right to copy as “a predicate right”; that is, one cannot
distribute copies of a work to the public without making those copies
in the first place. In other words, the act of public distribution requires a predicate act of reproduction, but acts of reproduction can
(and indeed, do) happen without the results being distributed to the
public. Indeed, as we have seen, many (if not most) acts of copying
are done in private. Do these private acts of copying constitute acts of
unfair competition? Alternatively, do they cause competitive harms in
the relevant markets to which authors and their publishers are entitled? At first blush, the answer might seem to be “yes” because these
acts, if unauthorized, might deprive copyright owners of sales—as
when, for example, friends lend each other books, hoping to share a
207
literary experience. Even if sharing among friends causes “harm” in
the form of lost sales, however, that harm might not be one that the
law should characterize as “competitive” because, on balance, such
sharing might benefit the public. Copyright law does not (and should
not) exist to internalize every externality that affects the public in a
positive way. To quote Professor Mark Lemley, “part of the point of
intellectual property law is to promote uncompensated positive externalities, by ensuring that ideas and works that might otherwise be kept
208
secret are widely disseminated.”
Indeed, as Professor Lemley has
observed, giving copyright owners the right to capture the value of
204

Stadler, supra note 62, at 632.
See Patterson, supra note 51, at 7.
206
Patterson, supra note 45, at 262; see also Patterson, supra note 51, at 42 (“If the
courts had perceived the dilemma, they could have avoided it easily by recognizing
that the right to copy was, in fact, the right to copy and vend.”).
207
But see Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1429 (2004) (describing sharing that occurs only “among small groups of friends, rather than open sharing with
strangers” as a “major victory” for “copyright enforcers”).
208
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1052 (2005).
205
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every use (i.e., to eliminate free riding) would impose significant
209
costs—not only on society, but also on creators themselves.
If, as I argue, copyright owners suffer “competitive harms” only
when others engage in acts of public distribution, then granting creators the exclusive right of reproduction provides them with a greater
benefit than they are entitled to expect. In other words, granting
creators (and their assigns) the reproduction right denies the public
the opportunity to access copyrighted works in ways that pose no significant threat to inducement—and indeed, might provide the public
with other benefits, such as expressive diversity. Suppose, however,
that Congress were to remove subsection (1) from section 106 of the
Copyright Act, which provides copyright owners with the exclusive
right of reproduction, leaving subsection (3), which provides the exclusive right “to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
210
lending.”
If copyright owners enjoyed the distribution right, but
not the reproduction right, then copyright owners would enjoy the
exclusive right to release copies of their works to the public, as they do
today. Copyright owners could not prevent others from copying their
works, but they would have the right to exclude those unauthorized
copies from the marketplace.
The distribution right has its limits, of course. Notwithstanding
the fact that at least some people might create so as to earn a royalty
every time a copy of their work changes hands, Congress has determined that creators are not entitled to expect those royalties, at least
insofar as authorized copies are concerned. Under the first sale doctrine, the first public distribution of a work in copies exhausts the dis-

209

See id. at 1058-65 (describing the economic costs of granting creators absolute
rights). Justice O’Connor has similarly observed:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used
by others without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed,
however, this is not “some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.” It is,
rather, “the essence of copyright,” and a constitutional requirement. The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
Feist Publ’ns. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (citations omitted).
210
At present, section 106 provides copyright owners with “the exclusive rights to
do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies or phonorecords; . . . [and] (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2000). As noted in Part I above, I do not
address the other section 106 rights in this Article. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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211

tribution right as to those copies. In adopting this limitation almost
212
a century ago, Congress clearly believed that the first sale doctrine
would provide the public with more benefits than costs. Accordingly,
Congress defined the relevant market in printed works so as to limit
that market to “first sales,” thus encouraging competitors to engage in
the further distribution of lawful copies that already had reached the
public. The last hundred years suggests that Congress was right to do
so: encouraging competition in secondary markets for copyrighted
works promotes the proliferation of copies, and it does so without exposing creators to the kind of competition that likely would threaten
their incentives to create.
Perhaps the most significant limitations on the right, however, are
found in the terms “public” and “distribution.” Under section 106(3),
copyright owners do not enjoy the right to prevent private distributions, nor do they have the right to exclude others from making uses
that do not qualify as distribution in the first place. Congress has not
defined these terms in section 101, but in defining the word “publicly”
(as it relates to performances and displays), Congress seems to have
suggested that a public act necessarily involves a “substantial number
of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social ac213
quaintances.”
The definition of “distribution” is more elusive. As
section 106(3) provides, distribution can occur “by sale or other trans214
fer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”
In general, courts
215
hold that distribution requires the “actual dissemination” of copies,
which means, in the digital world, “the transfer of a file from one
211

See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (providing that “the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner,
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy”). If section 106 were
amended to remove the exclusive right of reproduction, then section 109(a) would
have to be amended as well, for at least the reason that all copies would be “lawfully
made”—even those copies made without the authorization of the copyright owner.
212
See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (1909) (providing
that copyright owners cannot “forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained”).
213
17 U.S.C. § 101.
214
Id. § 106(3); see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 8.11[A], at 8-148 (“The copyright owner thus has the exclusive right publicly to sell, give away, rent or lend any material embodiment of his work.” (footnote omitted)).
215
2 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 8.11[A], at 8-149; see also Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc.
v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that “even
with respect to computer software, the distribution right is only the right to distribute
copies of the work”); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (N.D.
Cal. 2005) (noting support for the “view that distribution of a copyrighted work requires the transfer of an identifiable copy of that work”).
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216

computer to another.”
Thus, in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, Justice
Ginsburg observed for the Court that, “by selling copies of the [copyrighted] Articles through the NEXIS Database,” defendant
LEXIS/NEXIS “‘distribute[d] copies’ of the Articles ‘to the public by
217
sale.’”
Mere transmissions that do not involve a file transfer, however, likely do not constitute distribution (although they may qualify
218
as a performance or display).
Taken together, these limitations shed considerable light on the
scope of the right that copyright owners would enjoy if, as I have proposed, Congress were to provide them with the distribution right, but
not the reproduction right. As under existing law, copyright owners
would enjoy the exclusive right to release copies of their works to the
public, but they could not control later distributions of those copies,
nor could they control how members of the public interacted with
those copies in private. This means, necessarily, that a consumer who
216

Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 844 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001). Alternatively, as Justice Stevens suggested in dissent,
the NEXIS service may have constituted nothing more than an offer to distribute copies. Id. at 518 n.14 (“Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that NEXIS makes it
possible for users to make and distribute copies.”).
Would such an offer constitute “distribution?” The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has suggested that the answer is yes. In Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997), the court held that when a public
library “adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its index or catalog system, and
makes the work available to the borrowing or browsing public,” the library has engaged
in public distribution—even if there is no evidence that copies of the work changed
hands. But this cannot be right. There is ample evidence that Congress intended “distribution” to overlap with the concept of “publication,” which section 101 defines as
either (1) “the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”; or (2) “[t]he offering to
distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see also Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (observing that section 106(3) “recognized for the first time a distinct statutory right of first publication,
which had previously been an element of the common-law protections afforded unpublished works”). Under this definition, an offer to distribute copies of a work to the
public for the purpose of reproduction would not constitute publication—and arguably
would not constitute distribution, either. See Napster, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (“[T]o the
extent that Hotaling suggests that a mere offer to distribute a copyrighted work gives
rise to liability under section 106(3),” that suggestion was contrary to case law and “inconsistent with the text and legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976.”). Even so,
“courts have not hesitated to find copyright infringement by distribution” in cases involving peer-to-peer (p2p) networks. Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d
961, 968 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
218
See 2 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 8.11[A], at 8-149 (“Given that transmissions
qualify as public performances, liability for that conduct lies outside the distribution
right.” (footnotes omitted)).
217
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purchased an authorized copy of a copyrighted work could sell or give
that copy to a total stranger, toss it in the street, or “otherwise dispose”
219
220
of it —even if that copy existed in digital form.
That consumer
could make unauthorized copies of the work for herself, to use in private, as she chose. She also could give those copies to family and
friends for their private use. She probably should refrain from offering to distribute copies of the work to those who might engage in “fur221
ther distribution, public performance, or public display.”
Regardless, she would have a considerable range of uses to which she could
put the work. She simply could not distribute copies of the work to
the public; that is, she could not seek to compete with the copyright
owner in the marketplace for copies.
If this were the law, what result? In providing creators with exclusive public distribution rights, but not exclusive reproduction rights,
Congress would enable copyright owners to capture the value in some
uses of their works without forcing the public to sacrifice other interests that copyright law was meant to promote. Creators would continue to enjoy adequate incentives to create, and the public would
gain increased access to copyrighted works and would reap a number
of other significant benefits. Part III examines those benefits.
III. ON THE UTILITY OF COPYRIGHT AS TRADE REGULATION
A. Solving the “Problem” of Personal Copying
Most copyright scholars agree that almost nothing poses a greater
threat to the enterprise of creation than the “problem” of unauthorized copying. To quote Professor Marshall Leaffer, the “‘copying
problem’ presents challenges that transcend qualitatively anything in
222
history, and the economic stakes are greater than ever.”
Scholars
have responded to these challenges by proposing a number of solu-

219

17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000); see supra note 211.
But see 2 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 8.12[E], at 8-179 to 8-183 (discussing
whether the first sale doctrine applies to digital copies).
221
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “publication”); see also supra note 217 and accompanying text. In other words, given the relationship between distribution and publication, she probably should refrain from engaging in a “general publication”—that is,
from making copies of the work “available to members of the public regardless of who
they are or what they will do with it.” Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative
House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991).
222
Marshall Leaffer, The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a Global Information Marketplace, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 850 (2001).
220
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tions, of which Professor Peter Yu has documented no fewer than
223
eight. As he warns, however, there is “no panacea.”
One way to
solve the “copying problem,” of course, is to remove the right of reproduction from the list of exclusive rights in section 106—thus making copying perfectly legal. According to Professor William Patry and
Judge Richard Posner, however, this solution “would be the undoing
224
of copyright.”
Why? To be sure, the word “copyright” signifies the
“right” to “copy,” but any exclusive grant of the reproduction right
should rest upon a stronger foundation than semantics.
Scholars have competing theories as to why copying so threatens
the enterprise of creation. One theory (to which Patry and Posner
subscribe) is that reproduction forces down prices of copyrighted
works, thus depriving copyright owners of profits and thereby reduc225
ing their incentives to create.
As Professor Raymond Ku has observed, “[i]f competition from copiers drives the price of a work down
to the marginal costs of the copier, it threatens the incentives to dis226
tribute the work in the first place.” Even Professor Lunney, who advocates some private copying, has warned that instances of private
copying, “[a]lthough individually trivial, . . . in the aggregate could
radically reduce the incentive to create any given work of author227
ship.”
Yet acts of copying alone would not produce these results. Only
the distribution of unauthorized copies would tend to increase supply,
thus resulting in decreased prices (at least in a competitive market).
Further, only the public distribution of unauthorized copies would
tend to increase supply enough to have any appreciable effect on
prices. The private distribution of unauthorized copies might deprive
copyright owners of at least some profits as consumers shared purchased copies within “normal circle[s] of . . . family and . . . social ac228
quaintances.”
But given how broadly the courts have construed the
223

Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 698740 (2005).
224
William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (2004).
225
See id.
226
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market
Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539, 548 (2003).
227
Lunney, supra note 5, at 818; see also Patry & Posner, supra note 224, at 1644
(arguing that “unlimited” copying “would make it difficult and in some cases impossible for authors of expressive works to recoup their expenses in creating [their]
work[s]”).
228
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “publicly”).
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229

statutory definition of “publicly,” private distributions would likely
involve relatively few copies, which means that any lost profits would
230
be unlikely to have a significant effect on the inducement to create.
This may be why “[c]opyright owners in the twentieth century sued
counterfeiters but generally did not sue end users even if they were
231
making illegal copies”:
the benefits of enforcement did not justify
232
the costs.
Unfortunately, this approach seems increasingly anach233
ronistic.
If copying is thought to pose more of a threat to copyright owners
today, it is because technological advances are enabling copiers to
make “perfect copies” (and “perfect copies of the copies”) at “mas234
sive[ly] declin[ing]” costs.
As before, however, the problem is not

229

As the court wrote in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., “[t]he Copyright Act . . . does not require that the public place be actually crowded with people. A
telephone booth, a taxi cab, and even a pay toilet are commonly regarded as ‘open to
the public,’ even though they are usually occupied only by one party at a time.” 800
F.2d 59, 63 (3d Cir. 1986). The court went on to hold that a video rental store performed copyrighted audiovisual works “publicly” by permitting patrons to watch videocassettes in private screening rooms. Id; see also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd
Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a video rental store performed copyrighted audiovisual works “publicly” by transmitting those works to private
screening rooms).
230
Even public distribution may not have as significant an effect on inducement as
previously feared. See Daniel Gross, Does a Free Download Equal a Lost Sale?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2004, at Business 4 (discussing a recent study showing only a “small correlation” between music downloads and lost sales).
231
Lemley & Reese, supra note 207, at 1374.
232
See Wu, supra note 115, at 338 (“While this point is complicated by improved
technologies of copy protection, so long as there exist rights that would be extremely
expensive to enforce, the model of broad initial grants cannot be a complete answer.”).
233
In 1970, for example, Stephen Breyer (then a law professor) complained that
“[a] law-abiding user wishing to copy only a portion of a book or article . . . [would]
have to buy the whole book at a store or face the difficulty and cost of contacting the
copyright owner, bargaining with him, and arranging for payment.” Stephen Breyer,
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 316 (1970); see also Litman, supra note 78, at 932 (“When
Congress extended copyright protection to sound recordings in 1971, it had repeatedly affirmed that the Copyright Act did not then reach consumer home taping of music, and would not reach it as amended.”). Today, copyright owners are likely to take
the position that a “law-abiding user” can never copy, even if the user purchased the
book from which she wishes to copy. But see Gordon, supra note 3, at 190 (describing a
“judicial and legislative unwillingness to impose copyright liability on individual athome users”).
234
Lemley & Reese, supra note 207, at 1376; see also Lunney, supra note 5, at 849
(“Digital technology has fundamentally altered copyright doctrine by making widespread public copying possible.”).
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one of reproduction, but rather of distribution. The most significant
impact of technological advancement has been the transformation of
consumers into public distributors. With the click of a mouse, a person can use her computer to send thousands of “perfect copies” of
copyrighted works to thousands of strangers, or to make those copies
available for downloading by thousands more. Previously, this kind of
distribution required a significant amount of investment, and the resulting barriers to entry created the very oligopolies that are so quick
to blame reproduction technologies for their problems.
A second theory as to why copying causes harm is that copying
forces copyright owners to raise the prices of copies of their works,
presumably because competition from copiers leads to fewer sales for
copyright owners, thereby forcing copyright owners to maintain reve235
nues by charging higher prices.
According to the laws of economics, however, if copyright owners were losing market share to copiers,
then raising prices would be counterproductive. Copyright owners
who insisted on charging higher prices in such a competitive market
would, in the end, watch their market share erode considerably. Regardless, it would be unfair to blame copying alone for these competitive harms. Consider an example from the music industry: one suspects that record companies decided to give consumers the (legal)
opportunity to download individual songs at reasonable prices by participating in the iTunes music store only because online “distributors”
forced those companies to change the way in which they distributed
music. A guy in his basement can copy thousands of copyrighted
songs onto his hard drive, but he only inflicts competitive harm on
copyright owners when he makes those copies available to the public.
Record companies may love the reproduction right because it enables
them to threaten litigation against (and thus frighten away) as many
236
members of the public as possible, but this is not a good enough
reason to retain a right that Professor Julie Cohen has described as
“recogniz[ing] few boundaries,” “drafted extraordinarily broadly in

235

See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
217, 222 (“Prices would be lower in the absence of copying . . . .”).
236
See Cohen, supra note 48, at 965 (noting that the Copyright Register’s proposal
urging copyright holders to “adopt voluntary norms of self-restraint” requires
“[a]ppropriate norms to govern the public conduct of users [to] be publicly inculcated
through a combination of persuasion and fear, which means that judiciously targeted
lawsuits against users still have a role to play”).

946

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 899

the first instance, and . . . extended even more broadly by the
237
courts.”
238
If the “predicate right” of reproduction provides copyright owners with few benefits, there are significant public benefits to be gained
by withholding such a right. First, as we have seen, giving members of
the public the right to make copies of copyrighted works would increase access to those works during the copyright term without subjecting copyright owners to the kind of unfair competition that might
reduce their incentives to create. That access, in turn, would lead to
the creation of thousands of tangible copies—copies whose creation
the law now seeks both to prevent and to punish, regardless of
whether those copies are being used to compete unfairly with the
copyright owner. Not only are there significant archival benefits to be
239
gained by the proliferation of tangible copies, but as I have argued,
the proliferation and distribution of copyrighted works in tangible
form also promote the enterprise of learning. In fact, copyright law
240
always has recognized this relationship.
Article I, Section 8, Clause
8 of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to provide authors
241
with exclusive rights only in “Writings,” and, accordingly, Congress
has defined copyrightable works as only those “original works of au242
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”
If the fixation requirement serves other purposes—including evidentiary on-

237

Cohen, supra note 133, at 160.
Patterson, supra note 45, at 262; see also Patterson, supra note 51, at 42 (“If the
courts had perceived the dilemma, they could have avoided it easily by recognizing
that the right to copy was, in fact, the right to copy and vend.”).
239
Professor Gregory Lastowka has observed that “[c]opies of the past were valuable objects,” and if anything happened to the power grid, copies of the future would
be valuable objects, too. F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 300 (2001); see also Michael J. Madison, LegalWare: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1061 (1998)
(“Books and other information in physical form, however, continue to play an important role.”).
240
The House Report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act noted the Committee’s concern that “marketplace realities may someday dictate . . . less access, rather
than more, to copyrighted materials,” and that this “result could flow from a confluence of factors, including the elimination of print or other hard-copy versions.” H.R.
REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998).
241
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. In the Trade-mark Cases, the Supreme Court defined “writings” to mean “the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books,
prints, engravings, and the like.” 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
242
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
238
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243

es —it also provides the public with a tangible benefit in return for
the impediment to access that the grant of exclusive rights repre244
sents.
Granting the public more access to copyrighted expression also
might promote expressive diversity in surprising ways. To the extent
that the law today requires members of the public to be “consumers”
instead of “users,” copyright owners can train the public to satisfy its
demand for expression by looking to the copyright industries alone.
As Professor Benkler has argued (using Disney as an example), “increased prevalence of Mickeys should lead to increased investment in
forming preferences for their products. This should increase relative
demand for their products. Repackaging the Mouse becomes not
245
only cost effective, but also responsive to demand.”
In time, the
public tends to forget that the copyright industries are not the only
sources of creative expression. If, however, the public enjoyed the
246
right not only to “experience” copyrighted works, but also to make
copies of those works for private use, people might begin to interact
with copyrighted works in ways that raised the “common denomina247
tor,” at least in their own lives (and the lives of family and friends).
Meaningful access to creative works inspires creativity. Further, if the
public began to view copyrighted works not only as finished products,
but also as raw materials, demand for those works might even increase. So might the value of the copyrights themselves, as users seek
248
to license the right to market their improvements.
Yet another significant benefit of withholding the exclusive right
of reproduction relates to derivative liability. Since the Supreme
Court grappled with the issue of contributory liability in Sony Corp. of

243

See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 730-34
(2003) (examining the evidence rationales for the fixation requirement).
244
See Wu, supra note 115, at 361 (“[F]ixed media has the advantage of the fixed
form, packaging, and in some cases a superior product (real books are beautiful, very
portable, and operate without batteries).”).
245
Benkler, supra note 130, at 97-98.
246
See generally Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 115-16 (discussing how new media influences how people experience works, and how copyright law responds to new media).
247
See Lunney, supra note 5, at 888-89 (“Seeking the common denominator among
a wider audience leads almost inevitably to a lower common denominator.”).
248
See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997) (arguing that intellectual property laws help
inventors and the public by providing incentives for improving inventions).
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249

America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., copyright owners have brought
copyright infringement actions against manufacturers of copying
technologies that enable consumers to engage in unauthorized acts of
reproduction. In Sony, the Court held that under the “staple article of
commerce” doctrine, “the sale of copying equipment . . . does not
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for
250
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.”
“Indeed,” the Court added,
that product “need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
251
uses.”
In the last twenty years, however, copyright owners have convinced courts repeatedly to distinguish the holding in Sony, and the
252
Court itself did so in 2005.
These days, manufacturers of copying
devices may be guilty of contributory infringement if they distribute
those devices “with the object of promoting [their] use to infringe
253
copyright” —even if those devices are “capable of substantial nonin254
fringing uses.”
As Professor Jessica Litman has observed, “[d]efining
an appropriate boundary between contributory infringers and innovators in digital technology seems even more crucial today than it did
255
when the Court decided Sony.” Although that boundary promises to
remain elusive, it cannot be drawn if acts of copying alone are punishable as copyright infringement.

249

464 U.S. 417 (1984). For a description of the aftermath of Sony, see Litman,
supra note 78, at 947-60.
250
464 U.S. at 442.
251
Id.
252
The Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. instructed that “[w]here evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to
promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability.” 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2779 (2005). The Court observed that “the summary judgment record [was] replete with other evidence that Grokster and StreamCast, unlike the manufacturer and
distributor in Sony, acted with a purpose to cause copyright violations by use of software suitable for illegal use.” Id. at 2781.
253
Id. at 2767; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021-22
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Napster knew of specific infringing material on its system, could have blocked it, failed to purge it, and therefore could be liable for contributory infringement). The holdings in Sony, Napster, and Grokster are not limited to
new technologies, of course. As Judge Leval once asked, “why not also enjoin the use
of the camera, the audio-tape recorder, the photocopier, and the computer—perhaps
even pen and paper, or the printing press[?]” Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use Rescued, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1997).
254
See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775 & n.12 (citing and distinguishing Sony, 464 U.S.
at 442).
255
Litman, supra note 78, at 960.
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If copyright owners were unable to exclude others from copying
their works, then by definition they could not bring infringement actions against manufacturers of copying technologies (like the one in
Sony) for enabling those acts of copying. Liability for contributory infringement derives from acts of direct infringement, which means
there can be no derivative liability absent a violation of the Copyright
256
Act.
The benefit of withholding the reproduction right would be
obvious for manufacturers of devices, such as computers, that cannot
function without making copies. But that benefit also would be obvious for consumers, who would have the opportunity to purchase those
copying technologies without funding payments of royalties. In the
end, contributory liability would continue to be a threat only to those
257
companies (like Napster and Grokster) that enable and induce users to engage in the public distribution of unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works, thus causing competitive harm. If this is not a perfect boundary “between contributory infringers and innovators in
258
digital technology,” it certainly is an appropriate one.
B. Preempting the End Run Around Copyright
In addition to forcing third parties (such as manufacturers of
copying technologies) to police infringements, copyright owners also
have used other laws to control the ways in which the public interacts
with their works: first, by seeking to enforce restrictive “end user license agreements” under contract law, mostly for computer software,
and second, by persuading lawmakers to enact new laws (such as the
259
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) ) prohibiting users from
circumventing the encryption of copyrighted works—even in pur260
chased copies.
Scholars have characterized both of these end runs
256

Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1092-93 (9th Cir.

1994).
257

See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 (defining “inducement of infringement” as “advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an
affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was encouraged”).
258
Litman, supra note 78, at 960. Professor Litman argues that the need for a coherent boundary is still a pressing one, but that the Sony line “makes more policy
sense” than the line drawn by “any of its competitors.” Id.
259
Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76 (1998) (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000)).
260
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000) (prohibiting the circumvention of any
“technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under [title
17]”).
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around copyright as serious, even devastating blows to the public interest in copyright, in part because neither contract law nor anticir261
cumvention law makes exception for fair uses of copyrighted works.
As Professors Dan Burk and Julie Cohen have articulated the problem,
“[w]here technological constraints substitute for legal constraints,
control over the design of information rights is shifted into the hands
of private parties, who may or may not honor the public policies that
262
animate public access doctrines such as fair use.”
Notwithstanding the importance of these public policies, most
courts have upheld efforts to enforce exclusive rights by means of contractual or technological controls. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, for example, the court was asked to consider the enforceability under contract law of a “shrinkwrap” license prohibiting buyers from engaging,
inter alia, in the public distribution of databases containing telephone
263
directories.
(The distribution of the contents of those databases
would not constitute copyright infringement because under section
102(b) of the Copyright Act, protection does not extend to facts such
264
as telephone numbers. ) Writing for the court, Judge Frank Easterbrook held that the Copyright Act (in section 301(a)) did not preempt the enforcement of that license under contract law because the
“rights created by contract [were not] ‘equivalent to any of the exclu265
sive rights within the general scope of copyright.’”
As for technological controls, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley that the prohibition in section
1201(a) of the DMCA is not subject to the fair use provisions of sec261

See Gordon, supra note 5, at 915 (“[O]verbroad contract rules and the DMCA
are the true threats. They threaten the culturally-viable practices that fair use has historically sheltered.”); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511, 513 (1997) (“If these [shrinkwrap] ‘licenses’ are uniformly enforceable, all of the users’ rights of copyright will soon disappear.”); Lunney,
supra note 5, at 814-15 (arguing that the DMCA promotes the private interests of copyright holders over the public interest). But see Goldstein, supra note 4, at 146-47 (arguing that “[b]oth the critics and the proponents of anti-circumvention rules have
probably overstated the capacity of encryption measures to close off access to literary
and artistic works” and noting that “[a]ny signal that can be seen or heard can also be
copied, and without circumventing any encryption technology”).
262
Burk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 51. But see Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 125
(“[T]he ‘market failure’ genre of fair use should fade away in a world of . . . direct enforcement of copyright through access controls.”).
263
86 F.3d 1447, 1448-49 (7th Cir. 1996).
264
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (holding
that the alphabetical arrangement of telephone numbers in a directory was not original and therefore not subject to copyright).
265
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000)).
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266

tion 107.
As the court observed, “[w]e know of no authority for the
proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less
the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in
267
the identical format of the original.”
These decisions contain echoes of grievance, as if courts perceive
the remedies under copyright law to be inadequate to punish invasions of the property right, most of which involve acts of copying. The
result is a “law of control” that violates the spirit, if not the terms, of
section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, which provides that those “legal
or equitable” rights equivalent to copyright are to be “governed exclu268
sively by [title 17].” On the subject of contractual controls, scholars
269
have urged courts to invigorate the doctrine of preemption, but the
solution is not without its problems: how much of the state law on
contracts do federal courts have the stomach to preempt? As Professor Lemley put it, “[u]sing preemption doctrine against contracts is
something like swinging a sledgehammer at a gnat: you are likely to
hit the target, but you may do some serious damage to the things
270
around it.”
Worse, perhaps, “you might decide not to swing the
271
hammer at all, for fear of hitting the wrong thing.”
If preemption
seems tricky, try this proposed solution to the problems posed by technological controls: Professors Burk and Cohen have suggested that
the federal government create (and fund) an “escrow agent” whose
sole job would be to issue “keys,” case by case, to users who could
272
demonstrate a need for access to encrypted works. A far simpler solution, of course, would be enacting “an explicit . . . fair use exemp-

266

273 F.3d 429, 458-59 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 459.
268
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
269
See, e.g., Burk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 52 (“Where enforcement of a state law
contract would violate the public policy inherent in the federal intellectual property
scheme, or that embedded in the Constitution itself, such contractual provisions are
preempted.”). Professor Gordon predicts that “if such contracts become so ubiquitous
that they attach to virtually all copies, the result will be so property-like that courts will
subject the contracts to copyright preemption.” Gordon, supra note 5, at 912.
270
Lemley, supra note 121, at 145; see also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1269 (1995) (noting the “complex question of whether and how to preempt certain parts of contract law without bringing
down the whole edifice”).
271
Lemley, supra note 121, at 145.
272
Burk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 59-70. “Rights holders that opt not to deposit
keys with the escrow agent would be unable to invoke legal protection against circumvention.” Id. at 66. To their credit, Professors Burk and Cohen admit that their proposal “is a second-best solution designed to make the best of a bad situation.” Id. at 80.
267
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tion from the anticircumvention provisions” of section 1201 of the
273
DMCA, as Professor Benkler has suggested.
As we have seen, however, fair use has its problems, too.
Amending the copyright statute to withhold the exclusive right of
reproduction would do what these proposals would not: it would
eliminate much of the claimed need for access controls by erasing
many of the harms thought to justify those controls in the first place.
Consider the DMCA. Both the House and Senate reports issued in
support of passage contain language suggesting that the DMCA is necessary because of the threats posed by both unauthorized reproduction and unauthorized public distribution. The language in the Senate report is typical: “Due to the ease with which digital works can be
copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright
owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against
274
massive piracy.”
Of the reproduction and distribution rights, however, the former has drawn the most notice. For example, the Senate
report instructs that section 1201(b) is meant to “prohibit[] devices
primarily designed to circumvent . . . measures that limit the ability of
the copyrighted work to be copied, or otherwise protect the copyright
275
rights of the owner of the copyrighted work.”
In Corley, too, the
court focused almost exclusively on the threat posed by copying. It
did so, in part, by remonstrating “pirates” and “thieves,” whom it described as those “who want to acquire [i.e., copy] copyrighted material
276
(for personal use or resale) without paying for it.”

273

Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 578 (1999-2000).
274
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25
(1998) (“In contrast to the analog experience, digital technology enables pirates to
reproduce and distribute perfect copies of works—at virtually no cost at all to the pirate.”); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Fearful
that the ease with which pirates could copy and distribute a copyrightable work in digital form was overwhelming the capacity of conventional copyright enforcement to find
and enjoin unlawfully copied material, Congress sought to combat copyright piracy in
its earlier stages, before the work was even copied.”).
275
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 12 (emphasis added); see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 441
(“[T]he focus of subsection 1201(a)(2) is circumvention of technologies designed to
prevent access to a work, and the focus of subsection 1201(b)(1) is circumvention of
technologies designed to permit access to a work but prevent copying of the work or some
other act that infringes a copyright.” (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 11-12 (1998))).
276
273 F.3d at 435 (emphasis added); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]aking what is not yours and
not freely offered to you is stealing.”).
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If the exclusive right to make copies were not among those rights
listed in section 106 of the Copyright Act, then it would not be a
wrongful act to make copies of copyrighted works, so long as one did
not also distribute those copies to the public. Whither the rhetoric
about piracy and thievery? Copyright owners, of course, would continue to demand (and receive) protection against circumvention of
those technologies designed to hinder distribution. They might even
continue to demand hindrances to copying, but one hopes, at least,
that lawmakers would hesitate to grant copyright owners the right to
prohibit the public from engaging in acts of copying that would be
perfectly lawful under copyright law, in the service of which the
277
DMCA was enacted in the first place. Of course, if Congress were to
amend section 1201(a) of the DMCA to prohibit the circumvention of
only those measures that “effectively control the public distribution of
a work protected under Title 17,” the change probably would not stop
copyright owners from using technological measures to try to prevent
copying. But it also would not stop users from employing technological measures of their own.
As Professor Cohen has argued,
“[c]opyright owners cannot be prohibited from making access to their
works more difficult, but they should not be allowed to prevent others
278
from hacking around their technological barriers.”
This solution is
only as good as the hackers that might provide it, but it may be good
enough (for now).
In the case of contracts, too, withholding the exclusive right of reproduction would deprive copyright owners of many of their justifications for imposing restrictive terms on purchasers of copies (e.g., of
software). Copyright owners likely would continue to require that users agree not to engage in acts of copying. Because copying alone
would be perfectly legal, however, copyright owners would be guilty of
using contracts not to enhance their rights under copyright law, but to
create new rights. This effort to deny the public the benefits of legalizing reproduction would present a strong case for preemption, for as
the Supreme Court warned in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,

277

See Corley, 273 F.3d at 435 (noting that Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 “to
strengthen copyright protection in the digital age”).
278
Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed To Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 178 (1997). Professors Burk and
Cohen have argued that “[i]n some instances of overreaching via technological controls, the Constitution may even demand a limited . . . ‘right to hack,’ to surmount privately erected technological barriers to information that the Constitution requires be
publicly accessible.” Burk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 52.
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“[w]hen state law touches upon the area of [the copyright and patent]
statutes, it is ‘familiar doctrine’ that the federal policy ‘may not be set
279
at naught, or its benefits denied’ by the state law.”
But even if
courts would be hesitant to use the “coarser tools” of preemption, Professor Lemley has argued that the “better tool” might be the doctrine
280
of copyright misuse.
Copyright misuse consists of the use of a copyright “in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant
of a copyright”—as when, for example, a licensor attempts to prevent
its licensee from implementing the (unprotectable) ideas expressed in
281
the licensed works.
Contract terms that sought to prevent licensees
from exercising their right to engage in copying sans public distribution likewise would “violat[e] . . . the public policy embodied in the
282
grant of a copyright,” and therefore would render the offending
283
copyright unenforceable “‘during the period of misuse.’”
Again,
this would not be a perfect solution, but it would result in a more equitable balance between “the claims of individuals” and “[t]he public
284
good.”
C. Breathing Life into the Fair Use Defense
If, as Professor Patterson argued, the “question is not ‘what is fair
285
use?’ but ‘what is copyright?,’” then one cannot make sense of fair
use without first deciding, as Professor Litman put it, “what we have a
286
copyright law for.”
Not surprisingly, there is a lack of agreement on
this point. While two hundred years ago copyright may have been a
287
modest instrument of quid pro quo, today the “grand conception”
of copyright no longer can satisfy the demands that its many constitu-

279

376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (citation omitted).
Lemley, supra note 121, at 157-58; see also id. at 163 (suggesting, too, that courts
might place “federal public policy limits on contract enforcement” without “invoking
the mechanisms of preemption”).
281
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).
282
Id.
283
Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc. v. Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 204 (3d
Cir. 2003) (quoting Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520
n.9 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 n.22)).
284
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 61, at 279 (asserting that “[t]he public
good fully coincides [in the case of both the “copyright of authors” and the “right to
useful inventions”] with the claims of individuals”), quoted in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003).
285
Patterson, supra note 45, at 249.
286
Litman, supra note 45, at 365.
287
Leval, supra note 43, at 1110.
280
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encies have placed upon it. Professor Lunney may have described the
doctrine of fair use as “a central and vital arbiter between two compet288
ing public interests” —namely, inducement and access—but in fact,
that doctrine plays a minor role in the drama of copyright.
There are two reasons for this. First, an influential group of scholars has convinced many courts that the public interest is best served
when rights in copyrighted works can be acquired, parceled, and sold
289
as if they were tangible property. The resulting commodification of
creative expression is thought to serve the purposes of copyright law
by enabling the market to distribute that expression to more people
than it otherwise might reach. Scholars who embrace this principle
argue that the market, as opposed to the government, is best
equipped to locate the most productive ways to exploit copyrightable
290
works.
As Professor Wendy Gordon once wrote, the primacy of the
market means that fair use should exist only when the commodities
market in expression “fails,” either because transaction costs are too
high to facilitate a transaction, or because there is reason to believe
291
that no market exists in the first place.
If, in time, computer technology enables transactions with the click of a mouse, then fair use
must shrink, as must the power of the government to diminish the
rights that copyright holders enjoy. In the words of Professor Paul
Goldstein, “[f]or the great bulk of uses previously excused because of
292
transaction costs, the doctrine will simply become irrelevant.”
The second reason for the marginalization of fair use is that a distinguished jurist has convinced his fellow judges that the doctrine

288

Lunney, supra note 24, at 977.
See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 44, at 1148 (“To a considerable extent, primary
resort to the market vindicates the copyright owner’s claim that the copyright is his
property, to do with as he chooses; so long as a transfer may occur, he is allowed to obtain as large a share of the profit as he can.”).
290
See Netanel, supra note 55, at 309 (“For neoclassicists, copyright enables owners
to charge users for access to creative work public goods not so much to preserve author incentives as to determine what creative works are worth and thus to create a
guide for resource allocation.”).
291
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1601. Specifically, Professor Gordon has proposed
to apply the fair use doctrine “[w]here (1) defendant could not appropriately purchase the desired use through the market; (2) transferring control over the use to defendant would serve the public interest; and (3) the copyright owner’s incentives
would not be substantially impaired by allowing the user to proceed.” Id. (footnotes
omitted).
292
Goldstein, supra note 4, at 137; see also Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 125; Lunney,
supra note 24, at 976 (“Interpreted as an exceptional instance of market failure, Sony
has become its own limitation.”).
289

956

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 899

should be reserved for “transformative” works—that is, derivatives that
“add[] value to the original . . . in the creation of new information,
293
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.”
Ironically, Judge
Leval proposed this test so that fair use would “not be considered a bizarre, occasionally tolerated departure from the grand conception of
294
the copyright monopoly.”
It has not worked out that way. As Professor Diane Zimmerman has observed, “[c]ourts now feel obliged to
discuss the plausibility of virtually all fair use claims, at least in the first
instance, in terms of whether or not they involve transformative
295
uses.”
Not surprisingly, for litigants, the name of the game is to redefine “transformative” as the facts of the case demand, rendering the
296
concept increasingly meaningless.
Meanwhile, the test was never
that much of a guide. As Professor Lloyd Weinreb has pointed out,
“[a] use may serve an important, socially useful purpose without being
297
transformative, simply by making the copied material available.”
The Google Library Project is a perfect example.
The problem underlying these interpretations of “fair use” is that
the property rights to which the doctrine creates an exception have
grown increasingly, even unmanageably, broad. As those rights have
broadened, courts have come under increasing pressure to preserve
298
the “breathing space within the confines of copyright.” But the doctrine of fair use alone cannot provide that breathing space. First,
courts have many reasons for wishing to confine property rights, but
299
one doctrine cannot account for those reasons in any coherent way.
Second, the fourth factor in section 107 of the Copyright Act—“the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-

293

Leval, supra note 43, at 1111; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (describing a transformative work as a work that “adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new
expression, meaning, or message”).
294
Leval, supra note 43, at 1110 (emphasis added).
295
Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 260.
296
See id. at 262 (“Rather than adding certainty to the fair use analysis, [the transformative use test] seems . . . merely to have pumped more silt into already muddy waters.”).
297
Weinreb, supra note 44, at 1143; see also Lunney, supra note 24, at 977 (“Merely
increasing access to a work, even unauthorized access, represents a sufficient public
interest to invoke the fair use doctrine. A transformative or ‘productive’ use is not required.”).
298
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
299
See Madison, supra note 7, at 402 (“The substantive emptiness of fair use makes
it something of a dumping ground for copyright analysis that courts can’t manage in
other areas.”).
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300

righted work” —prevents courts from disappointing existing expectations to any significant degree. Over time, copyright owners have
come to believe that they are, indeed, “ordinarily entitled to revenue
for all substantial uses of [their] work[s] within the statutorily pro301
tected categories.”
Having come to expect to enjoy that property
right (and those revenues), copyright owners form incentives to create
302
accordingly.
Thus, it does not help to say that courts should find
fair use “[w]hen no incentive purpose would be served by giving
plaintiff protection, and where no disincentive would be created by
303
allowing defendant free use.”
Increasing the reach of the fair use
304
doctrine itself would create such a disincentive, thus trapping the
defense in a circularity of expectation.
The solution to the problem of fair use is to make the defense less
305
central to the enterprise of creation, not more.
The problem with
fair use is not that the defense is too narrow, but that the rights to
which it makes an exception are too broad. Say Congress were to narrow these rights by amending section 106 of the Copyright Act to give
copyright owners only the exclusive right “to distribute copies of the
306
copyrighted work to the public.”
Acts of copying, standing alone,

300

17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
Gordon, supra note 2, at 1651.
302
See Cohen, supra note 47, at 509 (“Self-evidently, this broad property-as-profit
rule protects the status quo distribution of entitlements and wealth; a right insulated
by a penumbra of monetary expectation will be relatively impervious to legislative
change.”).
303
Gordon, supra note 2, at 1618; see also Fisher, supra note 133, at 1687 (“The fair
use doctrine enables the judiciary to permit unauthorized uses of copyrighted
works . . . when doing so will result in wider dissemination of those works without seriously eroding the incentives for artistic and intellectual innovation.”); Justin Hughes,
Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 777 (2003) (“[T]here is recognition that
permitting too much adverse economic impact under fair use would undermine copyright’s incentive structure.”); Weinreb, supra note 44, at 1150 (noting the “broad
agreement that a determination of fair use should depend largely, if not exclusively
on . . . utilitarian assumptions about the copyright scheme,” including the question of
whether “the use interfere with copyright incentives to creative authorship”).
304
See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 141 (“Copyright owners will invest no more in
producing copyrighted works than they can expect to profit from them, and if the
profit horizon is systematically lowered by fair use, investment will be correspondingly
lower.”).
305
But see Stephen M. McJohn, Fair Use and Privatization in Copyright, 35 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 61, 89 (1998) (“[T]he role of fair use is broader and more central to the overall structure of copyright law.”).
306
Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2000) (granting “the exclusive rights . . . (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . ; [and] (3) to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work”).
301
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would not constitute prima facie infringement, and therefore acts of
copying, standing alone, would be legal without resort to the fair use
defense. This would be of obvious benefit to Google and its Library
Project: while Google has reproduced copyrighted works in their entirety, it has not provided the public with anything more than a few
“snippets” of those works, rendering any public distribution de minimis. In other words, because Google has not caused the publishers
any competitive harm in the relevant market (here, in books), its actions would not violate section 106 as amended. With the publishers
unable to make a prima facie case of copyright infringement, Google
would prevail without having to invoke the fair use defense, and without having to argue for a tortured interpretation of the word “transformative.”
If the Copyright Act had looked like this in 1976, when Universal
307
Studios sued Sony in the district court, then Universal, too, would
have failed to make its prima facie case because Sony was accused of
308
contributing to acts of copying—not acts of public distribution.
Universal having failed to prove copyright infringement, Sony would
not have pressed the fair use defense; the Supreme Court would not
have grappled with the question of whether home taping of television
programs was “fair”; Justice Powell, who “felt that home use should be
309
deemed fair use,” would not have cobbled together an opinion to
that effect; litigants, judges, and scholars would have been spared the
burden of trying to distinguish or breathe life into the holding in
Sony; and hundreds of copyright articles never would have been written. Some of these consequences might not be beneficial, of course; I
leave it for the reader to decide.

307

See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 429 F. Supp. 407 (C.D.
Cal. 1977).
308
Thus, Professor Stacey Dogan is correct in stating that “Sony’s exemption for
noncommercial copying . . . would not have shielded the vast majority of unauthorized
file sharing at issue in today’s peer-to-peer wars.” Sony, Fair Use, and File Sharing, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971, 971-72 (2005). Sony involved private copying via home video
recorders, not the sort of public distribution that so characterizes p2p. Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419-20 (1984).
309
Litman, supra note 78, at 929. Unfortunately, scholars would be deprived of
Professor Litman’s wonderful article telling the story of the Sony case before the Supreme Court.
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that in the name of “en310
courag[ing] . . . learning” by inducing acts of creation, lawmakers
are using copyright law to satisfy demands for private rights at the expense of other public interests in copyright. Those other public interests include, of course, public access to copyrighted expression, but
they also include open and populous markets in expression as well as
expressive diversity. At times, some of these interests may conflict:
giving creators (and their assigns) the right to exclude the public
from using copyrighted works necessarily would inhibit at least some
access; yet promoting free competition in the market for copyrighted
works likely would undermine the inducement of creation. I have
proposed to mediate these conflicts by conceiving of copyright law as
a prohibition against acts of unfair competition, whether by producers
or consumers.
Under this conception, copyright infringement would consist of
the infliction of “competitive harm” in a “relevant market.” I have defined these terms by asking what rights creators are entitled to expect
to enjoy when they engage in the act of creation. Those rights would
vary by type of work. As regards “printed works” (i.e., works created
for the purpose of existing in more than one copy), I have argued that
creators are not entitled to expect the right to exclude others from
engaging in acts of private copying because these acts, standing alone,
do not create market substitutes to any significant extent. Instead, I
have argued that those creators are entitled to expect only the exclusive right to distribute copies of those works to the public—as if, for
example, section 106 of the Copyright Act were to provide copyright
owners only with the exclusive right “to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public.” As Professor Patterson once put it, “if
copyright encourages creation, it does so only for the purpose of
311
profit. Profit, however, cannot be obtained without distribution.”
Because this profit depends on public distribution, acts of public
distribution are behaviors that threaten to cause competitive (i.e.,
public) harms. But acts of copying are not. For too long, lawmakers
have sought to punish private behaviors (like acts of copying) on the
theory that copyright exists to maximize the earnings, and therefore
the incentives, of the producers who subsidize acts of creation. As we

310
311

Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790).
Patterson, supra note 51, at 7.
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have seen, however, copyright also exists to provide the public with
meaningful access to diverse forms of expression from an abundance
of sources. Google is proposing to provide such meaningful access,
and there are thousands of ordinary users who might provide such diversity and abundance. The only thing standing in their way is a copyright law that presently ascribes legal significance to public and private
acts alike, regardless of the impact of those acts on the market in copies of copyrighted works. It is time for lawmakers to conceive of copyright law not as a means of granting property rights, but as a means of
using property rights to promote fair competition in the marketplace
of expression.

